E
173
.M29
no. 6

NUNC COGNOSCO EX PARTE

TRENT UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

PRESENTED BY

PROF. KENNETH KIDD

MANUSCRIPTS

FROM

The Burton Historical Collection

COLLECTED AND PUBLISHED BY

C. M. BURTON

NUMBER 6

Edited by
M. Agnes Burton

DETROIT, MICH., JANUARY, 1918

Trent University Library
PETERBOROUGH, ONT.

E 173 .M29 no.5

MANUSCRIPTS AND RECORDS

FROM THE

BURTON HISTORICAL COLLECTION

VOLUME I JANUARY, 1918 NUMBER 6

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Vincennes, August 7th, 1811.

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favors of the 17th and 20th Ultimo.* My letter of yesterday will inform you of the arrival and departure of Tecumseh from this place and of the route which he has taken.

There can be no doubt but his object is to excite the southern Indians to war against us. His Mother was of the Creek Nation and he builds much upon that circumstance towards forwarding his view. I do not think that there is any danger of any further hostility until he returns. And his absence affords a most favorable opportunity for breaking up his confederacy, and I have some expectation of being able to accomplish it without a recourse to actual hostility. Tecumseh assigned the next Spring as the period of his return. I am informed, however, that he will be back in three months. There is a Potawatomie War Chief here, who says he was present when the message from the British Agent was delivered to the Prophet, telling him that the time had arrived for taking up arms, and inviting him to send a party to Malden to receive the necessary supplies. This man is one of the few of those who preserve their independence.

The implicit obedience and respect which the followers of Tecumseh pay to him is really astonishing, and more than any other circumstance bespeaks him one of those uncommon geniuses, which spring up occasionally to produce revolutions and over-

*See *Dawson's Historical Narrative of the Civil and Military Services of Maj. Gen. William H. Harrison, pages 190-192.*

334837

turn the established order of things. If it were not for the vicinity of the United States, he would perhaps be the founder of an Empire that would rival in glory that of Mexico or Peru. No difficulties deter him. His activity and industry supply the want of letters. For four years he has been in constant motion. You see him today on the Wabash and in a short time you hear of him on the shores of Lake Erie or Michigan, or on the banks of the Mississippi and wherever he goes he makes an impression favorable to his purposes.

He is now upon the last round to put a finishing stroke to his work. I hope, however, before his return that that part of the fabrick which he considered complete will be demolished and even its foundations rooted up. Altho' the greater part of his followers are attached to him from principle and affection, there are many others who follow him through fear and he was scarcely a mile from the Town, before they indulged in the most violent invectives against him. The Prophet is impudent and audacious, but is deficient in judgment, talents and firmness.

Under the strong injunctions used in your letter against employing the Troops under Col. Boyd, but in case of absolute necessity, I shall forbear to call on here, any other part of them than the Company of Infantry of the 2nd Regiment commanded by Capt. Piat.

The outlines of my plan are to call upon all the Tribes, in the most peremptory terms to deliver up such of their people as may have been concerned in murdering our Citizens. To require them also to fulfill that article of the Treaty of Greenville, which obliges them to give information of and to stop any parties passing through their Districts with hostile intentions, and that all such as are marching to join the Prophet are considered by us as of that description. To require them also to cause such of their people as may have joined the Prophet immediately to return to their respective Tribes, or to put them out of their protection. From the Miamies I will require an absolute disavowal of all connection with the Prophet, and as they are the owners of the land he occupies, I will endeavor to prevail upon them to express to him their disapprobation of his remaining there. To all the Tribes I will repeat a declaration which I was instructed to make to them some years ago by the Secretary of War. That the United States had manifested through a series of years the utmost justice and generosity towards their Indian Neighbours, and had not only fulfilled all the engagements which they entered into with them, with good faith, but had spent considerable sums in endeavours to civilize them and promote their happiness, but if under those circumstances which they all had an opportunity of knowing any Tribe should dare to take up the Tomhawk against their Fathers, they need not expect that the same lenity would be shewn them as they experienced at the close of the former war, but that they would be absolutely exterminated, or driven beyond

the Mississippi. I believe, Sir, that by the employment of proper agents to disseminate speeches which shall contain the above demands and declarations and by making use of some management to secure the exertions of influential Chiefs in support of them that the combination formed by the Prophet will be dissolved. But to ensure success some Military force must be brought into view, for this purpose if it meets with your approbation and there will be time enough to obtain your answer, I shall about the middle of September move up to the upper line of the new purchase with the two Companies of Regulars, fourteen or fifteen Companies of Militia and two Troops of Dragoons, the latter comprising about one hundred men.

Should circumstances render it necessary to break up the prophet's establishment by force and I should discover that this force is not sufficient I can add to it two or three other Companies from this County and as many volunteers as I choose to accept from Kentucky provided they are suffered to be mounted. Indeed, Sir, they ought all to be mounted. The Militia of the Western Country are only formidable when acting as mounted Infantry, and in this way from the velocity of their movements. They are formidable, indeed, undisciplined as they are. I have taught a few companies around this place to form a line or line of Battle from a line of March in the manner practiced by General Wayne, but excepting these, there is nothing like discipline in the Infantry. Let me beg your attention to this subject and request that I may be allowed to use mounted Militia, upon any expedition that may be thought necessary. If circumstances should render Col. Boyd's Regiment unnecessary at the point to which they were originally destined, I had much rather have them than Militia. The event of General Wayne's action proved that disciplined musketry with their flanks secured by Dragoons and mounted riflemen are the best troops even against Indians. Infantry that are disciplined in the common manner can easily be formed for woods fighting, it requires only the observance of very open order and doubling up, instead of wheeling.

I have this moment received a letter from Governor Edwards No new aggression from the Indians had occurred in that Territory. Governor Edwards enclosed me the copy of a letter from himself to Governor Howard,* which contains so many just observations on our present difference with the Prophet and his party that I have taken the liberty of enclosing you an extract from it.

*Gov. Benjamin Howard, a native of Virginia, was twice elected to Congress from the State of Kentucky. On April 17, 1810, he succeeded Meriwether Lewis as governor of Upper Louisiana Territory. He resigned as governor a short time before the division of that territory and the admission of Missouri as a territory. In 1813 he was appointed brigadier general in the U. S. army and died at St. Louis, Sept. 18, 1814. On Feb. 14, 1811, he married Mary T. Mason, daughter of S. T. Mason, in Loudon County, Va. She died March 21, 1813. *Billon's Annals of St. Louis in Its Territorial Days, Vol. II, pages 402-404; Chicago Hist. Colls., Vol. III, pages 56-57.*

With great respect I have the Honor to be Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

The Honorable
William Eustis,
Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.

[ENCLOSURE]

Extract of a Letter from Governor Edwards to Governor Howard, Dated Elverado, Randolph County, Illinois Territory, Aug. 1st, 1811.

"Little indeed do I know of Indians, but that little induces me to believe without a doubt that our best policy is to use the most conciliatory course with those who treat us well, and the more prompt and energetic measures with those who treat us otherwise.

Such measures are particularly required at the present conjecture,—If we should have no british war—are right in themselves —just towards the Indians, and necessary to our safety.

If we are to have a british war—then the more severely we now punish the Indians when we can fight them single handed the more they will be detered—and the more difficult of course will it be to rally them against us.

We must come into collision with them or we must submit to their arrogance and aggressions and well do they know it. They have taken a hostile attitude against us—So long as we permit them to continue it, their confidence will increase, the seeds of discontent will be sown far and wide and they will be continually adding to their strength. What is the situation of the Prophet and his party? Precisely such that he can lose no more by war than by any pacific terms which Government could honorably offer them.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Vincennes, August 13th 1811.

Sir,

The distance between us is so great and I have so much diffidence in my own judgment that I have determined to take no step of importance in the present state of our Indian Relations without the advice and approbation of Governors Edwards and Howard. The most perfectly good understanding exists between us and the President may rest assured that our united councils and exertions will be directed to preserve peace with the Indians. I believe, however, that we all agree in opinion as to the necessity of breaking up the prophet's establishment upon the Wabash, but

at any rate to stop the further accumulation of force at that point. The latter may perhaps be effected by calling upon the contiguous Tribes as we have a right to do, to prevent the reinforcements destined for the prophet from marching through their country, and the latter by calling upon those who are connected with us by treaty to withdraw their warriors from him. But our demands and remonstrances must be supported by an exhibition of force. It is in vain to threaten unless we shew that we are not only willing but able and ready to chastise. Heedless of futurity, it is only by placing the danger before his eyes, that a savage is to be controlled. Even the gallant Tecumseh is not insensible to an argument of this kind. No courtier could be more complaisant than he was upon his late visit. To have heard him one would have supposed that he came here for the purpose of complimenting me. This wonderful metamorphosis in manner was entirely produced by the gleaming and clanging of arms and by the frowns of a considerable body of hunting shirt men, which accidentally lined a road by which he approached to the council House.

But let me assure you, Sir, that I feel most forcibly the responsibility imposed upon me, by the President's directions "to preserve peace if possible." And that resource to actual hostilities shall be had only when every other means shall have been tried in vain to effect the disbanding the Prophet's force. Unless this is done, no arrangement that we can make can ensure our tranquility for two months. And it appears to me, that the pecuniary interests of the United States are as much concerned in effecting it as are its honor and dignity, and the peace and prosperity of the citizens of the Frontiers. As to the means of accomplishing it, the appearance of a considerable force is essential whether we apply immediately to the prophet himself or indirectly through the medium of the other Tribes, in the manner proposed above. Backed by a measure of this kind our friends amongst the Indians would speak with firmness and decision. The timid would be overawed and the wavering (and the majority are of that description) brought over to our side.

I shall expect your final directions by the middle of September, and whatever they may be, whether agreeing with my own opinion or not, they will be punctually and cheerfully obeyed. When the Militia and Regular Troops act together in *this Territory,* the Articles of War would give me an unquestionable right to command. I am not certain what would be the effect should we be obliged to go into another Territory. The line separating this from the Illinois pursues the general course of the Wabash for some distance up and is found sometimes on one side and then on the other of that River. Besides it may be necessary that an expedition should be undertaken against some of the Tribes which reside in that Territory. From your last letter it appears that the President intended that the principal direction of the Military should be with me. Would it not be proper then that I

should receive some specific authority for that purpose. I know not well what it should be myself, but I should suppose something like that given to Governor Lee by the President upon the expedition against the Pennsylvania Insurgents in 1794.

I have already informed you that the best understanding exists between the Governors Edwards and Howard and myself, and as neither of them have had any military experience, I should have no doubt of receiving any authority that they could give, but by the Ordinance which is our Constitution they are precluded from giving any commissions higher than that of Colonel.

I have the honor to be with great respect, Sir,

Your Humble Servant,
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

The Hon'ble
Wm. Eustis Esq're,
Secretary of War.

Extract of a Letter from Governor Harrison to Mr. Johnson, Indian Agent at Fort Wayne.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Under these circumstances it is a matter of the first importance to ascertain how far the disaffection may have extended amongst the tribes of your agency, and to assure the fidelity of those who still continue faithful or who may be fluctuating between their attachment to me and the inducements which may be held out to them to join the hostile party. From what I have heard and my knowledge of the dispositions of those two tribes I have little doubt of the fidelity of the Miamis or Delawares and I should suppose that that part of the Potawatomies under the control of Tipithioupe the 5 medals, and the chief who was lately at the seat of Government are also to be depended upon. You will therefore please to communicate to them my apprehensions of the Tribes mentioned above and call upon them to fulfill that article of the Treaty of Greenville which oblige them to give information to the United States of any hostile intention that may be meditated against their settlements and also to prevent any such hostile party from passing through their Country—it will be necessary forcibly to impress upon them the necessity of doing this for their own safety. For as our people will generally pursue the attacking party and as it will be impossible for them to distinguish the several Tribes the innocent will frequently suffer for the guilty and a few accidents of the kind will bring on a general war with all the tribes. Such will be the wish of the Tribes who commence the attack and they will frequently so manage their war parties as to make the mischief, they do appear to be the act of our friends. The Tribes of the Miamies, Delewares

and Potawatomies ought then immediately to take measures, in the first place to find out what is the real object of the Prophet and his friends and if they find that he is really disposed for war and they cannot induce him to abandon the project to fall upon some scheme to protect themselves from its effects and if possible to keep without its vortex. We do not wish them to take part with us unless they should themselves think it necessary. We wish only to place them in such a situation that no part of the exemplary vengeance which we shall inflict upon those Tribes who have the temerity to attack us shall fall upon their heads. A situation admirably calculated for this purpose is offered by the White River Country—if a cordon of the friendly Tribes is formed on that River from its source down to the settlements and if they absolutely preclude those who are hostile from making war in that direction they may remain there in safety without the least apprehension of being disturbed by our warriors.

But to prevent if possible the necessity of this measure which cannot do otherwise than produce inconvenience to them, a solemn deputation from all the friendly Tribes should be sent to the Prophet and his party to remonstrate upon the folly and wickedness of their designs, which must inevitably terminate in their utter destruction.

You will be pleased also to state in all your communications with the Indians upon this subject that the war that may be waged against us by any of the Tribes shall be the last that they shall ever make—As it is the positive determination of our Government after having so long and so sincerely laboured for their advantage to open their eyes to their inferior condition and to provide the means of their improvement and civilization that they will not again suffer themselves to be imposed upon by the professions of those who have so often deceived, but that the War once began it will be pursued to the utter exterpation of those who shall commence it or until they are driven to such a distance as to preclude all probability of their again annoying us. To the Delewares Miamis and Potawatomies it may be observed that if they should be weak enough to suffer themselves to be seduced by our enemies the first consequence will be the forfeiture of their annuities which were granted upon the express condition of their acknowledgment of their dependence upon the United States and upon no other power whatever.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Vincennes, 14th August 1811.

Sir,

Since I had the honor to write to you yesterday Lieut. Hawkins has arrived, being dispatched by Capt. Piat from

Louisville to receive my instructions. After a mature deliberation upon the subject, I have thought it best to bring on the whole of Col. Boyd's Command to this place and for the following reasons. Altho You have not informed me of what point the Troops under Col. Boyd were originally intended,* I am convinced that their route must be down the Ohio and Mississippi,—their being here then will not prevent their pursuing their destination whenever the Government shall think proper. Lieut. Hawkins informed me that the whole Regiment is in keel Boats, and this circumstance together with the state of the Wabash which is in better order for navigation than I have ever seen it at this season will make their arrival here easy and expeditious and unattended with the expense of land transportation, a consideration which had some weight with me in forming the determination to bring on but one Company. Their arrival here (even if they should advance no further) will have the effect of convincing the Indians that the Government are seriously determined to protect the frontiers and to chastise the refractory Tribes. Should their services not be required to the Southward their being here will supercede the necessity of the employment of as many Militia for the purpose contemplated in my letters of the 7th & 13th Instant, as would be necessary without the aid of the Regulars—for these reasons I am convinced that you will agree with me that the Public Service will sustain no injury and that it may be benefitted by bringing on the whole Regiment to this place. It will be kept embodied and ready to descend the River whenever Orders to that effect may be received.

I have the honor to be with great respect, Sir,

Your Humble Servant,
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

The Hon'ble
William Eustis Esq.,
Secretary of War.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Jeffersonville (Falls of Ohio)
3rd September 1811.

Sir,

I came to this place a week ago expecting to find here the Troops under the command of Col. Boyd. He did not however arrive until this morning. Whatever may have been the cause of this delay it is a circumstance much to be regretted, as the

*In answer to these letters see Eustis' letter of Aug. 29. *Dawson's Historical Narrative of the Civil and Military Services of Maj. Gen. William H. Harrison, page 195.*

Ohio has fallen very rapidly, and the Wabash no doubt in the same proportion. The arrival of the Regular Troops at Vincennes will be thus retarded, until within a very few days of the time which I had fixed for marching up the Wabash. Further reflection has also induced me to believe that the destination of these Troops spoken of in your former letters might be to our frontiers bordering on upper Canada. Should this be the case and a Winters March to that Quarter contemplated, the road from Vincennes would not be so eligible as that from Cincinnati but at any time when the rivers are not frozen the former route is much the best from the facility for transportation afforded by the Wabash and Miami of the Lake. If this surmise of mine with regard to the eventual destination of the 4th Regiment is correct measures may be taken which would render even a Winter March from Vincennes by no means impracticable. I mention this not with an intention of prying into the views of the Government but merely to shew that I have had an eye to every possible inconvenience that could result from the execution of the discretion vested in me relative to the employment of Col. Boyd's Regiment. The people of this Territory and Kentucky are extremely pressing in offers of their service for an expedition into the Indian Country. Any number of men might be obtained for this purpose or for a march into Canada.

Previously to my leaving Vincennes I dispatched messengers to the several Indian Tribes containing the demands and declarations mentioned in a former letter—a demonstration of force on the Wabash will give efficacy to them and will most probably produce an entire dispersion of the Prophet's party. But should they fail, my own opinion is decidedly in favour of marching to the immediate neighborhood of his Town and demanding Hostages for their compliance with our demands on this subject. I will not however venture upon this step unless I receive your directions to that effect. It is also a question worthy of deliberation whether or not a Fort should be built on the reservation at the old Wea Towns, which is within fifteen miles of the Prophet's Residence.

I have appointed Capt. Piat Quarter Master of the expedition as he appears from a letter of yours to him to enjoy your confidence and is I believe very deserving of it.

I have the Honor to be with great Respect, Sir,

Your Obedient Servant,

William Henry Harrison.

Hon'ble
William Eustis Esq.,
Secretary of War.

Capt. Benjamin Parke to William Henry Harrison.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Vincennes, Sept. 13th 1811.

Sir,

In compliance with your Excellency's request of the 11th Inst., the following is respectfully submitted.

It is a fact that the Prophet's party is increasing.

That defection is evidenced amongst all the Tribes from the Wabash to the Mississippi and the Lakes.

That the Indians of the Wabash, Illinois etc. have recently visited the British agent at Malden.

That they are now returning from thence with a larger supply of goods than is known ever to have been distributed to them before.

That Rifles or fasees are given to those who are unarmed and powder and lead to all.

And that the language and measures of the Indians indicate nothing but war.

Under these circumstances the public interest certainly does require that a larger auxiliary force of Militia should be employed than that contemplated by the Honorable the Secretary of War in his letter of the 22nd ultimo.

And from the facts stated, it would not be safe to penetrate the country as high up as the Upper line of the new purchase with the force prescribed by the letter of the Hon'ble the Secretary of War above mentioned. Were the attempts to be made, it would probably terminate in defeat and destruction.

But, admitting there would be no danger of a defeat, I should still insist that a larger force than that contemplated by the Hon'ble the Secretary of War, ought to be employed.

The Prophet appeared as the head of a party about five years since—for these years his measures have evidently been of a hostile character. Negotiation has been tried in vain—he has not abandoned his projects—and his partisans are now found from the Wabash to the Mississippi and up to the Lakes. His artifice and intrigues and the bounty of British Agents have nearly perfected his plan of uniting all the Indians within our boundary, under him—and nothing but the appearance of a force much larger than that contemplated by the Hon'ble the Secretary of War will dissolve the confederacy. Four or five hundred men might excite alarm on the Wabash; but to make an impression on the distant Tribes a force of several thousand ought to be exhibited. This would silence the turbulent and unprincipled—restore the timid and wavering—and give countenance and support to the friends of the U. States.

Measures of a temporizing nature or any further delay would evidently jeopardize the peace and safety of the frontiers.

The smallest review of fortune on the part of the Government would instantly unite all the Indians against it—and a five years war would scarcely be sufficient to restore peace to the frontiers.

I have the Honor to be respectfully, Sir,

Your Obedient Servant,
B. PARKE,* Capt.
Light Dragoons.

His Excellency
William H. Harrison.

Waller Taylor to William Henry Harrison.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Vincennes, Sept. 15th, 1811.

Sir,

Your Excellency has requested my opinion on two propositions, the 1st is "Would it be safe to penetrate the Country as high up as the upper line of the new purchase with the force prescribed by the Honorable, the Secretary of War by his letter of the 22nd ultimo?" 2nd. "Admitting that there would be no danger of a defeat, would not the object of the Expedition be greatly promoted and the public interest essentially served by employing the whole auxiliary force provided by the Governor—say, eleven Infantry Companies of Militia and three or four of Dragoons?"

In answer to the first proposition, I beg leave to state as my decided opinion that the force contemplated by the Hon'ble the Secretary of War would be insufficient to accomplish the object in view with safety. The Spirit of Hostility manifested by the Prophet and his followers (who it is said are daily increasing), the thefts and murders committed within a few months past, and the unusual quantities of Arms, Ammunition, etc., which not only these, but the Indians generally have received from the British Agent at Fort Malden, strongly evidence a disposition to commence War as soon as a fit opportunity occurs If a small force were marched into their vicinity, very little doubt can be entertained but it would be attacked and most probably be defeated. Should this be the case our extended frontiers would be immediately exposed to the Ravages and depredations of warfare.

But admitting that a defeat would not result from marching to the upper line of the new purchase, still it is my opinion that

*Benjamin Parke. See note, page 109.

the object of the Expedition would be better promoted by employing a more considerable force than your Excellency has provided, tho' that may probably answer a very salutary purpose. To dissolve the Combination which is openly avowed to be forming amongst the Indians and which threatens destruction to our scattered and defenceless Citizens, requires a force that would awe the turbulent and refractory, confirm the timid and wavering, and insure protection and safety to the friendly and well disposed. It would therefore seem to me the best policy to crush in Embryo a scheme, which if suffered to be matured, will involve the United States in a war with the Indians, to terminate which great expense will be incurred, and the lives of numbers of our Citizens will be sacrificed.

I have the Honor to be with great Respect, Sir,

Your Obedient Servant,
WALLER TAYLOR.*

His Excellency
William H. Harrison.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Vincennes, 17th Sept. 1811.

Sir,

I have the Honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd ultimo. From letters which you will have received from Col. Boyd and myself you are apprised of my having anticipated your orders, and that the whole of the Detachment under his command are on their way to this place. The Colonel came through with me by land from Louisville and the Troops were sent round by water under the command of Col. Miller. I calculate upon their being here tomorrow or next day. I must now, Sir, request the Honor of your attention whilst I explain the motives which have induced me to exceed your Instructions with regard to the number of Militia to be employed as auxiliaries to the regular Troops upon the proposed Expedition up the Wabash. In my letter of the 7th Ultimo I informed you that I contemplated using two Companies of Regulars 14 or 15 of Militia Infantry

*Waller Taylor was a native of Lunenberg County, Va. He studied law and came to Vincennes in the early territorial days to practice his profession. He was elected judge of the Court of Common Pleas and when the state was admitted to the Union in 1816 was elected U. S. senator. During the Tippecanoe campaign he acted on Harrison's staff as major and aid-de-camp. He died at his mother's house in Lunenberg County, Va., Aug. 26, 1826. *Cauthorn's History of the City of Vincennes, page 190; Filson Club, No. 15.*

and two Troops of Dragoons, making an aggregate of nearly 1200 men. The Substitute of the whole of Col. Boyd's detachment for an equal number of Militia is doubtless a very favourable exchange, particularly if the object was to bring the Indians to action under any circumstances. But the number of the Detachment fit for duty on the day of their arrival at Louisville was not much above four hundred and it is more than probable that other casualties will considerably reduce it. Capt. Posey's Company now in garrison at Fort Knox with five or six men of the Rifle Corps annexed to it will not give more than forty effective, making in all of Regular Troops about four hundred and fifty, from this is to be deducted a small command to be left in Garrison at Fort Knox. The Remainder added to the two Troops of Dragoons will form a force of 550 men, a number about equal to that which the Prophet has under his immediate control. My own opinion is that with this force we might march to the upper line of the new purchase, erect a Fort and return with safety. It would however present to the Indians a great temptation and the defeat of this Detachment would give to the Prophet's Party an eclat that would enable him to effect his purpose of uniting all the Tribes in a War against us. The appearance of a Military force in the Neighborhood of the Indian Towns will produce a good or an ill effect in proportion to the operation it will have upon their fears. A small body of men will excite their contempt, a large one (such as they will think themselves unable to resist) will not only deprive them of a wish to measure their strength with ours, but will cause all those who waver to decide in our favour and even many of those who are now in close union with the Prophet will think of nothing but retracing their steps and submitting to a compliance with our just demands. Our Friends will be unabled to speack out openly as such and be freed from the necessity of skulking about the Woods (as at this moment) for fear of their lives. You will see below that Mr. Dubois reports that almost every Indian from the Country above this had been or were then come to Malden on a visit to the British Agent. We shall probably gain our destined point at the moment of their return. If then the British Agents are really (as I most sincerely believe) endeavouring to instigate the Indians to make war upon us) we shall be in their neighbourhood at the very moment when the impressions which have been made against us are most active in the minds of the savages. In your letter of the 17th July you enjoin it upon me in the most peremptory manner "not to attack the Prophet without having a force that would ensure success." The injunction appears to me to include a prohibition of placing myself in a situation with a Military force where I could be attacked with success, as the consequences in either case would be nearly the same. Upon the whole I think that the preservation of peace which is the great object of the President (and certainly of myself also) would be Jeopardized by

the employment of any force which the Prophet might think himself able to contend with. I do not think him much of a Warrior, but he is certainly daring, presumptuous and rash. In proportion to the strength of our Detachment not only the relative but the actual numbers of his followers will be decreased and if such a force as I could raise in two weeks was to go up and erect a Fort upon the reservation of the Old Wea Towns, I would pledge my reputation for Judgment and a knowledge of the Indian Character if four fifths of his followers would not instantly abandon him. And being once undeceived with regard to his ability to defend them they would never be brought to unite with him again. I cannot however think myself authorized to employ a larger force than is sufficient to deter an attack from the Indians or to chastise them should they think proper to attempt it. It will consist of the Regular Troops above mentioned, 8 or 9 companies of Militia Infantry and three or four Troops of Dragoons. At this season of the year the Militia can leave their homes without any material inconvenience. The sole objection then to the employment of this force is on account of the additional expense. And can the pay of a few Companies for 30 or 35 days be an object worthy of consideration to the United States when they are employed to take possession of a Country to which they have a fair and just claim by the sale of which they will be so amply remunerated? The sale of the small slip adjoining the Greenville Boundary line takes place next month and unless I am very much misinformed the proceeds of it in two months from the day that the office is opened will bring more money into the public Treasury than will be sufficient to reimburse the purchase money for both the Tracts and all the incidental Expences which have occurred since. I rely upon the Candour of the Government for my justification in this affair. The Troops of Cavalry are composed principally of Gentlemen to whom the pay is no object but as the whole are not of this description I presume that no discrimination can be made. I have actually engaged but one Troop from Kentucky, but I understand that another has been formed by young Gentlemen at and in the Neighbourhood of Lexington who have done me the Honor to think that they could receive some Military information by serving under my command. It is not my intention, Sir, to accept of any compensation for my services on this occasion nor even remuneration for my Expences. The Beef and Flour which I shall be obliged to take from the Contractor will be included in the provision Abstract, but no other Article that is consumed in my family will be placed to the public account.

As soon as I received your favour of the 22nd Ultimo I laid it before Col. Boyd and the Honorable Waller Taylor & Benjamin Parke, two of the Supreme Judges of the Territory, and both Militia officers and requested their opinions in writing upon the Expediancy of employing a larger force than that contemplated

by your letter. I have done myself the honor to inclose their several answers. I expect Governor Howard and General Clark daily. Governor Edwards is I hear very sick and gone to some Medicinal Spring in Louisiana. I have not heard from him since the return of the officer whom he sent up the Illinois River to demand the perpetrators of the late murders. But I have seen a young man (a connexion of the Governors) who was on the command. He informed me that the Chiefs professed a willingness to deliver up the Culprits but declared that they were not within their power having taken refuge with the Prophet. I hope to be able to march on Saturday next. But I have some fear of a deficiency on the part of the Contractor. The Government need be under no apprehension for us Sir. If the Prophet attacks us we shall beat him. I promise you at least that we shall not be surprised and that if the men will fight (of which I have not the least doubt) they shall do so when perfectly prepared. The Greek Maxim "Asphales Garaot Ameion e thrasus Statelate" which was so great a favourite with Augustus (who bye the bye was I believe inferior as a Warrior either to the little Turtle or Tecumseh) shall be ever present to my mind. And in Indian Warfare (whatever it may be in any other) it is certainly a good one.

When I received your letter of the 17th and 20th July I dispatched an Indian Messenger to bring back the Miami Chiefs who had accompanied Tecumseh to this place and who had only left it two days before. The Messenger did not overtake them until they had reached their Towns. They refused to return alledging that the letters which I pretended to have received from the President were forgeries and that they were told by white men at Vincennes, that I intended to practice this cheat upon them. I immediately prepared speeches to be sent to the different Tribes conformably to the plan mentioned in my letter of the 7th Ultimo. And I employed Mr. Dubois a French Gentleman who is well known to and much respected by the Indians to carry the one intended for the Miami. He found the Chiefs all preparing to go to Malden. With the assistance however of Messrs. Shaw and Wells he got them all together at Fort Wayne. The result of the Council discovered that the whole Tribe (including the Weas and Eel Rivers for they are all Miamis) were about equally divided in favour of the Prophet and the United States. I have the Honor to enclose a Copy of my Speech and the original Minutes of the Council as taken by Dr. Turner‡ at Fort Wayne. The Lapousier who makes the insolent speech is the Wea Chief who spoke in the late Council here and whom I before mentioned to you as being seduced by the Prophet. Mr. Dubois repeatedly demanded of him what land it was that he was deter-

‡William Turner, born in Maryland, enlisted from Maryland and was made garrison surgeon mate July 9, 1810; surgeon of the 17th Infantry, April 7, 1813; resigned Jan. 31, 1815. *Heitman's Hist. Reg.*, etc.

mined to defend with his blood. Whether it was that which was ceded by the late Treaty or not; but he would give no direct answer. Mr. Dubois reports that all the Indians of the Wabash have been or now are on a visit to the British agent at Malden. He has been in the Indian Trade thirty years and has never known as he thinks more than one fourth as many Goods given to the Indians as they are now distributing. He examined the share of one man (not a Chief) and found that he had received an elegant Rifle, 25 pounds of Powder, 50 of lead, 3 Blankets, 3 Strouds of Cloth ten shirts and several other articles. He says that every Indian is furnished with a Gun (either Rifle or fusil) and an abundance of ammunition. A Trader of this Country was lately in the Kings stores at Malden, he saw 150 kegs of Powder (supposed to contain about 60 pounds each) and he was told that the quantity of goods for the Indian Department which had been sent over this year exceeded that of common years by £20,000 sterling. It is impossible to ascribe this profusion to any other motive than that of instigating the Indians to take up the Tom hawk. It cannot be to secure their Trade, for all the Peltries collected on the waters of the Wabash in one year if sold in the London Market would not pay the freight of the Goods which have been given to the Indians. Altho' I am decidedly of opinion that the tendency of these British measures is hostility to us, candour obliges me to inform you that from two Indians of different Tribes I have received information that the British Agent absolutely dissuaded them from going to War against the United States. One of them (a Delaware) says that he was present at the Audience given by the Agent (Elliot)* to 300 Sacs from the Mississippi. The latter informed him that they had taken up the Tom hawk against the United States at the request of the Prophet and that they come there to get Arms and Ammunition; that Elliot told them that he would supply their wants but strongly advised them to decline the meditated War.

I have the Honor to be with great Respect, Sir,

Your Humble Servant,

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

P. S.

Col. Boyd has not yet prepared the written opinion above men-

*Matthew Elliott was born in Ireland between 1735 and 1740, and came to America in 1761. He was a soldier in Bouquet's expedition which relieved Fort Pitt at the time of Pontiac's conspiracy in 1763. After the Indian wars he became an Indian trader, making his headquarters at Pittsburg. During the Revolution, on one of his trips to Detroit, he was arrested as an American spy. He cleared himself and in 1778 was appointed captain of the Indian Department at Detroit. He served throughout the war on the British side and when peace was established he remained in Detroit, where he obtained a city lot for his services in the war. He also obtained 3,000 acres of land near Fort Malden, or Amherstburg, and subsequently another grant of 1,000 acres. Elliott removed to his Canadian property some time before the fire of 1805, was appointed assistant agent of Indian affairs and finally superintendent of Indian affairs. He took a prominent part in the War of 1812 and died May 7, 1814. His wife was Sarah Donovan, daughter of Matthew Donovan. *Governor and Judges Journal—Proceedings of the Land Board of Detroit, by Burton, 1915, page 217.*

tioned but he authorizes me to say that it is precisely the same with Judges Taylor and Parke.

The Honorable
William Eustis Esq.,
Secretary of War.

[ENCLOSURE]

William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, to the Miami, Eel River and Wea Tribe of Indians.

My Children,—You had left this place but two days, when I had received letters from your great father the President of the seventeen fires, and it was my wish that you should know what they contained, because their contents were of consequence to you. I sent after you one of your own people inviting you to return. You not only refused to do so but you insulted my messenger. You insulted me and the great Chief of the seventeen fires whom I represent. You told him that the letters which I pretended to have received were forgeries.

My Children,—This conduct of yours has grieved me much and my Anger against you was for a while very great but I have now cast it off. And I feel nothing but pity for you and anger against those who have accused you. I now speak to you in the name of your Father the President of the seventeen fires—listen to me.

My Children—My eyes are open and I am now looking towards the Wabash. I see a dark cloud hanging over it. Those who have raised it intended it for my destruction, but I will turn it upon their own heads. My Children, I hoped that you would not be injured by this cloud, you have seen it gathering you had timely notice to keep clear of it, the thunder begins to roll, take care that it does not burst upon your heads.

My Children. I now speak plainly to you. What is that great collection of people at the mouth of the Tipecanoe intended for? I am not blind my children, I can easily see what their object is, these people have boasted that they will find me asleep, but they will be deceived. My Children, do not suppose that I will be foolish enough to suffer them to go on with their preparations until they are ready to strike my people. No. I have watched their motions. I know what they wish to do, and you know it also. Listen then to what I say. I will not suffer any more strange Indians to settle on the Wabash. Those that are there and do not belong there shall disperse and go to their own Tribes. My Children, When you made the Treaty with General Wayne you promised that if you knew of any parties of Indians passing through your Country with hostile intentions towards us that you would give us notice of it and endeavor to stop them.

I now inform you that I consider all those who join the Prophet and his party as hostile and call upon you to fulfill your engagements. I have also sent to the Tribes who have any of their warriors with the Prophet to withdraw them immediately. Those who do not comply I shall consider to have let go the chain of friendship which united us.

My Children—Be wise and listen to my voice. I fear that you have got on a road that will lead you to destruction. It is not yet too late to turn back. Have pity upon your women and children. It is time that my friends should be known. I must draw a line. Those that keep me by the hand must keep on one side of it, and those that go to the Prophet on the other. My Children. Take your choice. My warriors are in motion, but they shall do you no hurt unless you force me to it. But I must have satisfaction for the murder of my people and the war-pole that has been raised on the Wabash must be taken down. My Children let me know your determination by Mr. Dubois; he will explain to you everything. Do not suffer bad advice to mislead you. Throw yourselves again into the arms of your Father, and he will receive you and nourish you.

Do not be afraid to speak your minds. Tell those people that have settled on the Wabash without your leave that the land is yours and you do not wish them there. Do not be afraid to say this. You shall be supported. My Warriors are getting ready and if it is necessary you shall see an Army of them at your backs more numerous than the leaves of the trees.

[ENCLOSURE]

Mr. Dubois' Report.

Oscemit, Puttawatomie Chief.

He did not wish what he was now going to say to be put on paper as it was rather advice to his people. He observed as the rest of the Chiefs were absent he thought it his duty to make a few remarks in behalf of his nation, saying that it appeared to him that his younger brothers on the Wabash had got on a wrong road, that the Governor had told them of it, and that it was not yet too late for them to turn back. We the Puttowatomie Chiefs have told our young men not to listen to the Prophet but notwithstanding some of them was foolish enough to hear his counsel.

Charley the Eel river Chief spoke at considerable length very favourably; but did not wish any part put on paper; only That Laprusieur the Wea Chief came forward and made a speech without consulting or knowing the opinion of the Indians.

The Little Turtle Miami Chief.

Governor William H. Harrison. Father, your speech by Mr. Dubois was communicated to us yesterday. Father, your children the Miamies of the Wabash are all glad to hear what you say, this is the sentiments of the Indians. Father you have asked us whether we are disposed to take part with the Prophet, or hold you fast by the hand. This question causes us to believe that some misunderstanding has took place between you and some of our people that has visited you lately. It appears also that you have made your intentions known to the Potawatomies respecting the Prophet; you have told the Pot's and other Indians living on the Wabash to leave him. You have told the Miamies the same thing. These are things that have surprised us. The transactions that took place between the white people and Indians at Greenville is yet fresh in our minds; at that place we told each other that we would in future be friends, doing all the good to each other and raise our children in peace and quietness. These are yet the sentiments of your children the Miamies. Father you have told us you would draw a line, that your children should stand on one side and the Prophet on the other. We the Miamies wish to be considered the same people that we were at the treaty of Greenville holding fast to that treaty that united us the Miamies and Putawatomies. Father listen to what I have to say; it is our request that you pay particular attention to it. We pray you not to bloody our ground if you can avoid it; in the first instance let the Prophet be requested in mild terms to comply with your wishes and if possible avoid spilling of blood. The land on the Wabash is ours, we have not put the Prophet there, but on the contrary we have endeavoured to stop his going there. He must be considered as setting there without our leave. Father I must again repeat; you say you will draw a line between your children and the Prophet. We are not pleased at this because we think you have no right to doubt our friendship towards you. I have not said much to you but I think I have said enough for the present occasion. My words are few but my meaning is great and I shall close by requesting that you will pay particular to what I have said. This is all I have to say. I have said it in presence of your Messenger and people of this place as also my own people.

Oscemit,

I have said that I am here alone I have come to attend to the interest of my women and children, I have thought it my duty to do so as the other Chiefs of my Nation was absent. When I heard the words of my Father. We the Potawatomies inhabiting the Lakes from Chicago round to the east are of the opinion as those of the Miamies, just delivered by The Little Turtle. Notwithstanding some of our foolish young men have killed some of the whites. We the chiefs of our nation have told our young men not to listen to any bad birds that are flying in the air, notwithstanding some of them have been led astray in not listening

to our words, and have imprudently involved themselves in difficulties.

Therefore we are determined that their faults shall not be charged to our nation. We the Putowatomies and Miamies have been friends and brothers since children. We shall continue to be so, their sentiments are ours and ours theirs. Father what we said to each other at the treaty of Greenville is fresh on our minds. We there told each other that improper conduct of individuals should not involve us in difficulties. This also must be fresh in your memories for you wrote it down and I hope it will long be remembered by both of us. I have nothing further to say.

White Loon.

You have heard what my Uncle the Little Turtle has said, and my mind is the same.

Little Turtle addressing the Miamies.

I told my people when they were going to see the Governor not to say anything respecting the land, that the treaty was made and it was a fair one. They had signed the paper which bound the sale of the lands and that nothing farther should be said on the subject. I also charged them whatever they did to have nothing to do with the Prophet, that the Prophet was an enemy of Governor Harrisons, and Governor Harrison of his; that if they formed any kind of connection with the Prophet, it would make the Governor enemies of theirs.

Silver heels the Massassisway Chief, spoke at great length, and said; that he informed his people that he conceived it greatly to the interest of his Nation, that a decisive answer should be given to their great father's speech, that he had asked for it, and that he was intitled to have it, that for himself he had always detested the Prophet and his doctrine, and that the interest of the Nation required of the Miamies, that they should have no connection with the Prophet; that in case a misunderstanding should take place between the U. States and the Prophet it is the interest of the Nation to remain neutral, and hold our father by the hand.

My Chiefs and warriors now present, I hope this will be the answer that you will say to our great fathers.

[ENCLOSURE]

Speeches Delivered by the Different Miamie Chiefs in Council at Fort Wayne, in Answer to a Speech from William H. Harrison, Governor of Indiana Territory, Addressed to the Miamie Tribe of Indians.

Laprusieur the Wea Chief.*

William H. Harrison Governor of Indiana Territory.

Listen to what I have to say, you wish to hear what I had to say. You tell us that we are now on a wrong road, a road that will lead us to destruction. You are deceived we are not on a

*Lapouisseur. See note, page 103.

wrong road. When I was walking along, I heard you speak respecting the Shawanoe. You said we were of his party. I hold both you and the Shawanoe by the hand, but I hold him slack. You have both told me one story; that if I would adhere to you, that my people the women and children would be happy. on the choicest spot of land. We are now anxiously waiting to see which of you tells the truth. For the first time Father, your The hearts of the Miamies is good, the great spirit has put them eyes are now open. When you cast them on your children you see they are poor; they are destitute some of them, even for the necessaries of life. We want ammunition to support our women and children, and the want of those things has compelled us to undertake our present journey. Father, we have not let you go, we yet hold you by the hand, neither do we hold the hand of the Prophet with a view to injure you, therefore I now tell you that you are not correct when you supposed we joined hands with the Prophet to injure you.

Father I listened to you a few days ago, when you pointed out to me the depredations of murder that has been committed by the Indians on the Mississippi. I told you that I and my people had no wish to join in acts of that kind. I told you that we both loved our people, that it gives us pleasure when we see them standing around us, that we should deprive ourselves of this pleasure if we commence a war with each other, as a war would be the destruction of both parties. You always told me that our great father, the President of the U. States, has placed you here for good purposes, that his heart is good towards his red Children. How then does it happen that our father's heart is changed toward his red children.

Father you have called upon us to fulfill the Treaty of Greenville; in that treaty it is mentioned that we should give information if we knew of any hostile design of a foreign power against each other. I now tell you that no information from any quarter has reached our ears to injure any of your people or ours, except from yourself. You have told us that the thunder begins to roll.

Father your speech has overtaken us at this place, we have heard it, but it has not scared us, we are not afraid of what you say. We are now going on to that country which has been frequently visited by Tecumseh and we shall be able to know in the course of our journey whether he has told us lies or not; that all the Indians were of the same opinion that he is; but when we return we shall be able to tell you whether what Tecumseh has told us be true or not.

Now father you have heard what I have to say, you will hear it well, what come from me.

Father you have told me twice that you were very angry with me. I went to see you with my warriors, we were sitting close face to face, and toes to toes; you told me that the Indians on the Mississippi had struck you, and I said nothing to you.

You now tell us that you sent a messenger after us, that we had insulted the messenger, yourself, and our great father. This is twice that you have told that you were angry with us, we have looked for the cause, but can find none. Father, we the Miamies are not a people that is passionate, we are not so easily made angry, as it is supposed you are. Our hearts is as heavy as the earth and our minds are not easily irritated; we don't tell people we are angry with them for light causes; we are afraid if we did fly in a passion for no cause, we should make ourselves contemptable in the eyes of others; therefore we hope you will no more say you are angry with us, least you should make yourself contemptable to others. We have told you we would not get angry for light causes. We have our eyes on our lands on the Wabash with a strong determination to defend our rights, let them be invaded from what quarter they may; that when our best interest is invaded, we will defend them to a man, and be made mad but once.

Father now consider your children the Miamies, what they have said to you. You have now offered the war club to us, you have laid it at our feet, and told us we might pick it up if we chose. We have refused to do so, and we hope this circumstance will prove to you, that we are people of good hearts.

We hope father that you will not be angry any more with us; we will not be angry with you. This is all I have to say.

From an observation of Mr. Dubois the following expressions fell from the lips of Laprusieur.

If Governor Harrison draws a line and leaves us out, he may, but if he takes us in, it is very good. But if our lands are invaded, we will defend them to the utmost, and die with the land.

Here follow the names of the Chiefs that were in favour of Laprusieur speech.

Pucan

Big-Man (or Lagros

Negro-Legs

Osage

The one that eats stones.

Names of the persons that took these notes.

Fort Wayne,
4th September 1811.

Wm. Turner S. Mate
U. States Army.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Vincennes, 25th Sept. 1811.

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th of August. Mine of the 18th Inst. will have informed you that I had anticipated your last instructions by the Employment of a larger Militia force than was contemplated by your favour of the 22nd Ultimo. The Regular Troops under Colonel Miller arrived here on the 19th at night. Their sick at that time very little increased from the time of their departure from Louisville—within a day or two however a considerable number have been added to the sick reports. Their complaints are intermittents of the slightest kind and Dr. Foster assures me that the greatest part of them which are on the sick report will be able to march. This was intended to have taken place on this day, but an uncommonly heavy rain which is now falling has induced me to postpone it until tomorrow.—As the Militia are entirely without tents and the saving them even one severe wetting is an object of some consequence. We shall however take up our line of march tomorrow morning at Reveillie rain or not. The Cavalry were sent off yesterday to Bosseron (20 miles in advance) where forage can be more easily procured. The 20th Inst. had been fixed by me to commence our movements and the Troops were here on that day, but it was not until yesterday that a boat load of flour arrived for the Contractor, this added to what he had on hand amounts to little more than 12000 rations, he has however more coming up the Wabash which will follow us. Our whole force will amount to about one thousand men including one hundred and forty Dragoons and 60 mounted Riflemen.

I have the satisfaction to inform you Sir that the speech which I sent to several of the Tribes by the Potowatomie Chiefs and the report of a considerable assemblage of Troops being about to be moved at this place has brought forward a deputation from the Prophet's Town full of *professions* of peace, and that I have *extorted* from them a promise to comply with our demands. But I must previously inform you of a circumstance of a very different Character which happened about twelve days ago but which has only been entirely developed since the date of my last letter. As Capt. Piatt was coming from Louisville to this place his Horses and that of another Traveller were taken from the stable on the White River 35 miles from this and the night after four others from the Bosseron settlement. The trail of the Horses from the latter place was very visible, and two white men and a

Free Negro who speaks some of the Indian Languages went immediately in pursuit of them. They crossed the Wabash and on the second day near night they came to the Indian Camp. There were but three Indians in the Camp and they soon discovered their own horses. Captain Piatts and a number more. After some conversation they agreed to give up the four horses which were taken from Bosseron. Our People then commenced their return and had gotten but a few miles when they perceived the Indians in pursuit of them; having but one gun amongst them they endeavoured to escape by flight but the two foremost Indians soon came so near as to fire. on them and the Negro would have been killed if he had not thrown himself from his horse. They had no other alternative than to abandon all the horses, even those which they rode and betake themselves to a thick swamp which luckily presented itself. They separated and after having suffered much from hunger and fatigue they all reached home.

The Hostility and the Spirit of determined aggression upon us manifested by the above transaction called for some energetic measure. And I had resolved as soon as I had erected a Work at the point contemplated on the Wabash that would admit of defence to make a demonstration towards the Prophet's Town and even to march into it unless satisfaction was made.

The apparent head of the Mission from the Prophet's Town above mentioned is the old hereditary Chief of the Kickapoo Tribe who has been deprived of his authority by the Prophet and not suffered to act as a Chief since he signed the last Treaty two years ago, but the efficient Character of the party is a War Chief of talents, entirely devoted to the Prophet. In his first speech he expressed his astonishment at seeing such warlike preparations —that it had excited great alarm—that his women and children were all in tears—that his heart and the hearts of all the Prophet's party were warm toward the United States,—that their establishment had no other object than peace and that he wanted to know what were our intentions. In my answer I declared the great reluctance with which their Father would draw the sword against his red children, but that the injuries which his own people had sustained were such that he could no longer put up with them. I recapitulated all the instances of hostility which they had manifested towards us and informed him that it was the President's positive determination to have retribution for the past and some security for the future. In the Council of yesterday I informed them that the Army would march in a day or two, that I should go up the Wabash shortly and if they were inclined to join our friends who were endeavouring to have the persons who had killed our people taken and the stolen horses returned, they might meet us on the way. He answered that the time was too short, that nothing could be done this Fall, that we must wait until the next spring and then they would get all the Indians together and

endeavour to find out who had injured us. I then informed him peremptorily that the Army would march today and that the distance they would go up the Wabash would depend entirely on the Indians themselves—that if they would not deliver up those who had murdered our people and restore the stolen property we must take on ourselves the trouble of finding them altho it might be the means of doing injury to some innocent persons. A Potowatomie war Chief whom I had employed to take one of my speeches into the Indian Country at that moment arrived. And I seized the occasion of telling the Kickapoo that that man knew of the hostile intentions of the Prophet's party and was present (the Kickapoo himself being also present) when the speech from the British Agent was delivered to the Prophet telling him "that the time had arrived for them to take up Arms." But notwithstanding we had such full evidence of their bad designs against us we would again receive them as our children upon their compliance with our just demands. I gave until this morning to consider of what I had said. "He wanted no time—he could answer then—every thing that I wished should be complied with as far as is possible. The stolen horses should be restored—he did not know where the murderers were but would endeavour to find them—he would go up to his Town, do what he could to satisfy me and return to meet me. The hour for the closing the mail is so near that I have only to add

that I am with greatest consideration Sir,

Your Obedient Servant,
William Henry Harrison.

I have not yet had an interview with the Potowatomie Chief. He declines saying any thing until Winimac's arrival which is every moment expected.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Camp on the Wabash 65 Miles from
Vincennes, October 6th 1811.

Sir,

I have the Honor to inform you of the arrival of the Troops under my command at this place on the 2nd inst. The regular Troops stood the march surprisingly well. There are a good many sick but most of them of very slight complaints and there is not an Individual who can be called ill. I have reconnoitred the Country nearly to the boundary line and have fixed upon this as the most

eligible situation for a Fort.* The timber is now preparing and it will be finished with all possible dispatch. We have as yet seen no Indians, those excepted who were at Vincennes previously to the Commencement of our March. I expect a deputation from the Prophet's Town in five or six days, if I do not I shall send one to him and make a movement with the Troops in that direction. Those scoundrels have been again plundering our Citizens. They took eight horses from a detached settlement in the Illinois Territory about 30 miles above Vincennes nine or ten days ago in open day light. I sincerely wish that my instructions were such as to authorise me to march up immediately to the Prophet's Town. The Troops which I command are a fine body of men and the proportion of Regulars, Irregulars, Infantry and Dragoons, such as I could wish it. I have reason to doubt the issue of a contest with the savages and I am much deceived if the greater part of both officers and men are not desirous of coming in contact with them. I bear constantly in mind your injunctions on the subject of the return of the 4th Regiment to Pittsburg this Winter, I fear however that the thing is impracticable. Both men and officers (the Colonel excepted) are extremely desirous to winter in this Territory, and if they have not time to reach Pittsburg before the freezing of the Ohio it certainly would be advisable, rather than to occupy any immediate point upon the Ohio where they could do no manner of service. This Regiment is in great want of clothing. It arrived at Newport shortly after the departure of the Regiment from thence. Col. Boyd consulted me upon the subject of the orders to be given respecting it and I recommended that it should be sent to the mouth of the Wabash because the wants of the men were represented to be so great as to make it a considerable object to get the clothing as soon as possible even if their ascent of the Ohio were certain. I shall dispatch the 4th Regiment as soon as I can make any satisfactory arrangements with the Indians. But if any change of circumstances should render it less necessary at the point to which it was originally destined I am persuaded that its being placed in winter quarters here would be greatly beneficial to the public service. I beg you however to believe, Sir, that I shall endeavour to the utmost of my power to execute your intentions without suffering my own views and opinions to have any influence in producing a necessity for deviating from those which you have or may do me the Honor to communicate.

With perfect Respect, I have the Honor to be

Your Humble Servant,

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

The Honorable
William Eustis Esq.,
Secretary of War.

*Fort Harrison.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Camp Battle dis Illinois,
13th October 1811.

Sir,

Your letter of the 18th Ultimo I had the Honor to receive yesterday. My views have hitherto been limited to the erection of the Fort which we are now building and to a march by way of feint in the direction of the Prophet's Town as high perhaps as the Vermillion River. But the powers given me in your last letter and circumstances which have occurred here at the very moment on which it was received call for measures of a more energetic kind. I had always supposed that the Prophet was a rash and presumptuous man but he has exceeded my expectations. He has not contented himself with throwing the Gauntlet but has absolutely commenced the war. His parties were in our neighbourhood for the first time on the night of the 10th inst., our Centinels were fired on and one of the best men of the 4th U. States Regiment badly tho' not mortally wounded. The Army was immediately turned out and formed in excellent order in a very few minutes. Patrols were dispatched in every direction but the darkness was such that pursuit of the enemy was impracticable—other alarms took place in the course of the night probably without good cause, but the Troops manifested an alertness in taking their positions which was highly gratifying to me. Previously to my leaving Vincennes I had sent to the Delaware Towns to request some of their Chiefs to meet me upon the march that I might employ them in missions to the several Tribes which have a part of their warriors with the Prophet. All the Chiefs of this faithful Tribe that were able to march set out from their Towns on the 6th Inst. They had proceeded but a few miles when they were met by a deputation from the Prophet's Town requiring from the Tribe a Categorical answer to the question "Whether they would or would not join them in the war against the United States—that they had taken up the Tom hawk and that they would lay it down only with their lives. They had however positive assurances of victory and when they had beaten the Americans, those Tribes who refused to join them would have cause to repent it." The Delaware Chiefs immediately dispatched the Interpreter Mr. Connor and four of their men to inform me of this circumstance and that they had determined to go immediately to the Prophet's Town to endeavour to divert him from his purpose, that they would be with me in a few days and communicate the result of their mission. And that if they were success-

ful in their endeavours to prevent the Prophet from striking us they would abandon him to his fate." From this statement of facts, Sir, you will no doubt be of opinion with me that the return of the Troops under my command without effecting the dispersion or humiliation of the Prophet's Party would be attended with the most fatal consequences. If he is thus presumptuous upon our advance our return without chastising him or greatly alarming his fears and those of his followers would give him an eclat that would increase his followers and we would have to wage through the winter a defensive war which would greatly distress our Frontiers. With this conviction thoroughly impressed upon my mind it is with the greatest mortification I have to observe that my advance to the Prophet's Town depends upon circumstances which are entirely without my control. The supply of provisions on hand is by no means sufficient and the means of land transportation for it altogether inadequate. We have hitherto depended upon water transportation but it is impossible to rely upon it in our advance from this. From the winding course of the river and the nature of the ground near it the ascending boats cannot be protected by the Army. Defending them by detachments is equally impracticable because I could not make them sufficiently large without weakening my main body so as to expose it to certain defeat. As soon as I received your letter therefore I directed the Contractor to send down to Vincennes for five or six wagons and upon the arrival of these must depend in a great measure the practicability of our advance. The Fort is in such forwardness as to enable me to leave it in three days but it is necessary that we should wait for the waggons. The necessity of this delay suggested the idea of obtaining a reinforcement. I have certainly the highest opinion of the bravery of the Troops under my command and the composition of this little army is entirely to my mind, but with regard to actual service they are altogether raw and inexperienced. The Militia are the best I ever saw and Col. Boyd's Regiment is a fine body of men. But like all men who are about to engage a strange and untried enemy many of the privates have imbibed such ideas of Indian address and ferocity that it was found a matter of some difficulty to keep the sentinels to their posts the night after the alarm. Two of the Delawares who are now in camp speak good English and before I was aware of it an opinion had been pretty generally imbibed from them amongst the men and by most of the officers that our force was too small to attack the Prophet with success. From the return which is herewith enclosed you will observe that our effectives are but little above nine hundred. From these must be deducted a small garrison for the Fort and perhaps twelve or fifteen more sick than the report recognizes. From all the information which I have received I cannot estimate the Prophet's force at less than 600 men. Whatever precautions I may use it will be in his power to attack us when and where he pleases and

precipitate the whole of his force upon our weakest point. With raw Troops I found upon my march hither that it was impossible to preserve that order and precision in our movements which is so desirable and necessary. The maneuvers which I have adopted for forming an order of Battle from the order of march altho extremely simple the men are not sufficiently expert in performing altho' every opportunity has been embraced of practicing it. A panic or confusion from an attack at that particular moment might be fatal. From Mr. Connor I learn that all the Delawares were impressed with a belief that the Prophet would attack us and that he and his followers were confident of success. I know not from whence this confidence can be derived, it is certain that it was not felt four weeks ago. I cannot learn that he has received any accession of strength—And the ridiculous and superstitious pranks* which he is practicing inspire his followers with a belief in his supernatural powers can impose upon them only. Whatever may be the cause of this confidence the probability of its existence is sufficient to inspire caution. I do believe most sincerely that the Troops I have now with me are equal to the task of beating all the force the prophet can muster altho admitting him to have 600. The relative proportion is less favourable to us than it has ever been in any general action with the Indians. But I am not so ambitious of military fame as to subject the Troops under my command to any unnecessary hazard to obtain it. A few companies more would make success entirely unequivocal. I have the Honor to inclose to you the result of a Council which I have held with my superior officers on the occasion. With their opinion I entirely coincide. I have sent for four Companies. Three only were contemplated by me but to secure three it was necessary to send for four. I shall not wait for them but move with cautious steps for twenty five or thirty miles higher up so that we shall not have but forty or forty five miles to march when the reinforcement comes up. I have directed them to come on mounted. In the meantime my own and the exertions of my officers shall be used to inspire the men with confidence in themselves and contempt for the Enemy.

I would have believed that the message which was sent by the Prophet was an empty boast if his parties had not been sent to fire on our sentinels. But however unsuccessful our advance may have been in making a favourable impression upon the prophet it is certain that it has made such a one on the Weas and Miamis. The Chiefs of the former who have just returned from Malden are now collecting their women and children (who had fled on our approach) at their village about two miles from us. The Miami Chiefs are also on their way to visit me, and the Weas say that the Wyandots have opened the eyes of them all and that they will never again listen to the Prophet.

*See note, page 135.

I am extremely glad that the return of Col. Boyd's Regiment to Pittsburg may be dispensed with it will certainly be of considerable service here and the season will be so far advanced before they can commence their voyage as to have scarcely a probability of their being able to get there, and it would be exceeding harrassing to the men. This Regiment is not more sickly than when I wrote to you last week altho' the weather has been uncommonly warm and consequently unfavourable. Two men have indeed died in Camp within this week and one within a few hours after my last letter was written but he was so well in the morning as to be able to walk out and killed himself by eating heartily of fried liver.

I have the Honor to enclose to you herewith a letter from Dr. Foster; he says that his private affairs so imperiously require his presence that unless he can get a furlough he must resign. I think him so valuable an officer that he ought if possible to be kept in service. His presence can be dispensed with for you may rest assured that the autumnal frosts will restore his Regiment to perfect health, and respectable medical men can be procured here if the Regiment should remain with us. Lt. Colonel Miller has been very much indisposed but is better. He will not however I fear be able to march with us, a circumstance infinitely to be regretted. For the experience he has had I have known no better officer and he is so much beloved by the officers and men of the 4th Regiment that I am persuaded that they would follow him to the Devil. Col. Boyd commands all the Infantry as a Brigadier. There is not an officer of the regular troops (Col. Miller excepted) who cannot eat his rations as heartily as he ever could. The two that were left at Vincennes (one with an accidental hurt) are well and are coming up.

I have the Honor to be with the Greatest Respect, Sir,

Your Humble Servant,
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

The Hon'ble William Eustis Esq.,
Secretary of War.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Camp Battelle Des Illinois, 28th Oct. 1811.

Sir,

The want of provisions and waiting to know the result of the Delaware Mission to the Prophet has detained me here until this time. The Fort has also taken much more work than I had expected and the great deficiency of axes and the bad quality of those which we had has protracted the finishing it to double the

time that it would have taken otherwise. It is now however completed and is a very handsome and strong work. The baggage is now loading and the General will be beaten as soon as a boat load of flour which can at this moment be but a few miles from us makes its appearance. The Delaware Chiefs arrived in camp yesterday and gave an account of their efforts to induce the Prophet to lay aside his hostile designs in presence of all the Officers. "They were badly received ill treated and insulted and finally dismissed with the most contemptuous remarks upon them and us." The party which fired upon our sentinels arrived at the Town when the Delawares were there. They were Shawanoes and the Prophet's nearest friends. Nothing now remains but to chasten him and he shall certainly get it. One of the Companies which I have ordered on will join us today and another tomorrow. I cannot account for the conduct of the Prophet upon any rational principle. Many of the Potawatomies have left him—from the best accounts I can get he has not more than 450 men. But there are desperadoes wound up to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by his infernal arts. The Delawares left him practising his magic rites and performing their war dances day and night. I am still in hopes that the Kickapoos will abandon him on our approach. The sick amongst the Militia have greatly increased since the last report but the regular Troops which are on the sick report are generally better. I am happy to inform you that the whole of the Troops are in fine spirits and eager to come in contact with the Enemy. I have used every exertion in my power to perfect them in the manoeuvers which they are to perform. I have exercised them myself almost daily and their progress has been such that I do not hesitate to pronounce them as perfect as Gen. Wayne's Army was on the day of his victory over the Indians. I promise you Sir that all the objects intended by the Expedition shall be effected. Wells account of the manner in which the murders in the Illinois Territory were perpetrated is absolutely false. The truth is that they were directed by the Prophet for the purpose of forcing the Indians of the Illinois River to unite with him. He has determined to commit to the flames the first of our men whom he can take Prisoners.

I have the Honor to enclose herewith a return of the Troops under my Command.

I am with sincere Respect, Sir,

Your Humble Servant,
William Henry Harrison.

P. S.

The Miami Chiefs have just arrived. They are entirely humbled.

The Hon'ble William Eustis Esq.,
Secretary of War.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Camp near the Vermilion River,
Nov. 2nd 1811.

Sir,

I arrived at this place with the Troops under my Command last evening. I crossed the Wabash about ten miles below this and have been this day employed in the erection of a small block house upon the bank of the Wabash for the protection of the provisions and boats which I shall be obliged to leave here as the best and most direct road to the prophet's Town passes so much to the northward of the River that the boats can be no longer protected in ascending. Indeed I was not able to cover them as completely as I could have wished in the ascent to this place. And I was in constant apprehension of their being attacked when we were not in a situation to defend them. I was congratulating myself on their safe arrival when a letter from Col. Miller (whose indisposition was such as to oblige me to leave him at the new Fort) announced the unfortunate intelligence of an attack upon a boat loaded with corn which was ascending the River from the Fort to this place. It was fired on four miles above the Fort and one man killed. The crew immediately returned to the Fort. This circumstance has caused me much apprehension for the settlements below. I have therefore sent off a small detachment of mounted Riflemen to patrol round the settlement and have directed the senior Militia officer at Vincennes to put every man upon the alert and to call out one or two companies should he think it necessary. The Country round me has been examined for a considerable distance. Some signs of Indian parties passing southwardly have been discovered, but in the attempt to trace them up the best woodsmen I have were baffled.

I am now from the best information I can get about 40 or 45 miles from the Prophet's Town. The Country is generally open and there are as I understand a few places only where we can be advantageously attacked by the enemy. This information shall not however lull my vigilance. We march tomorrow morning and shall reach one of the most difficult passes (called pine Creek) on the 4th Inst., the anniversary of General St. Clair's defeat. Should we be attacked on that day I hope to alter the Color with which it has been marked in our calendar for the last twenty years. I have been joined by two out of the four Companies of mounted Riflemen which I ordered on. There is no probability of the others coming up. The spy which I sent to the Prophet's Town has not returned and I very much fear that he

has fallen a victim to his confidence in the friendship of the Indians for him.

Captain Wentworth has sent in his resignation through Col. Boyd. I was consulted on the occasion and gave my sanction to the measure because eleven out of twelve of his brother officers expressed an opinion of his being entirely unfit for the service. I thought it best however to order him to take the immediate command of the new Garrison as the extreme low state of Col. Miller's health made it necessary that there should be another officer. I remained at the Garrison a few hours after the march of the Army and the Captain took that opportunity to request my permission to leave the Fort and return to Vincennes. I pointed out the necessity of his staying and referred him to Col. Miller who was so weak as to be unable to walk without the assistance of a stick. The Colonel's answer was that he hoped I would permit him to go as he had rather spare the Captain than the meanest soldier in the Garrison. I mention this in the hope that the Captain's pay and Emoluments may cease on the 29th Ultimo the day he left the Fort.

It was my intention to have named the Fort after one of the Heads of the Department who performs his duties not more advantageously to the public interests than satisfactorily to those who have the Honor to receive their orders from him, but recollecting that it was a temporary work and would be only wanted for a few years it occurred to me that I should do injury where I meant to do honor. At the request of my Officers therefore I gave them permission to name the Work and they were pleased to call it Fort Harrison.

I have the Honor to be with great respect, Sir,

Your Humble Servant,
William Henry Harrison.

The Honorable
William Eustis,
Secretary of War.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Head Quarters
Near the Prophet's Town
Nov. 8th 1811.

Sir,

I have the honor to inform you that the dawn of yesterday* terminated an action between the Troops under my Command and the whole of the Prophet's force, their precipitate retreat leaving a number of the warriors dead on the field and the subsequent abandonment of their Town (which was partially fortified) attest for us a complete and decisive victory. It has however been dearly purchased. A number of brave and valuable men have fallen victims to their zeal for their country's service. The behavior of both regular and Militia Troops was such as would have done honor to Veterans. I arrived at my present position (a mile from the Town) on the evening of the sixth Instant. A correspondence was immediately opened with the Prophet and there was every appearance of a successful termination of the expedition without blood shed. Indeed there was an agreement for a suspension of hostilities until a further communication should take place on the next day. Contrary however to this engagement he attacked me at half past four o'clock in the morning, so suddenly that the Indians were on the Camp before many of the men could get out of their Tents. A little confusion for a short time prevailed, but aided by the great exertions of the officers I was soon enabled to form the men in order. The Companies which were hard pressed were supported. Several successful charges made and about day light the enemy were finally put to flight after having penetrated to and killed men in the very center of our camp. Our killed and wounded amount to 179, of these 42 are now dead and seven or eight more will certainly die. (I believe that the Prophet's force is so entirely routed that he will not be able to collect a sufficient number to harrass us on our return. But should this be the case it may be in his power, encumbered as we are with the wounded to do us considerable injury. We are moreover destitute of every article of provision excepting the corn (which we have taken) and about four days

*John Tipton was an ensign in a company of Indiana militia under command of Capt. Spier Spencer and kept a journal of the campaign which is printed in the *Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 2, pages 170-184,* and also in *Readings in Indiana History, 1914, pages 111-119.* During the battle the company lost all of its officers and Tipton took command. After this he reached the rank of brigadier-general of militia. He became very prominent in the early history of Indiana and in 1831 was elected U. S. senator from Indiana. He owned a great deal of land in the Northwest Territory and the City of Columbus was built on his property. It was called Tiptonia, for a time, in his honor. He was born in Servier County, Tenn., Aug. 14, 1786, and died in Logansport, Ind., April 5, 1830. *Appleton's Cyclopedia of American Biography.*

issue of flour at the short allowance of ¾ of a pound per diem. Indeed the Army have drawn no more than this for three weeks and all our beef cattle broke from us the night of the action and were dispersed and driven off by the Indians. You may rest assured Sir that I shall make every exertion in my power to conduct the Troops in safety to the settlements. I have not been able to ascertain the number of Indians in the action, it must however have been considerable. The principal chief of these Potawatomies who have joined the Prophet is wounded and in our possession. I have taken care of him and shall send him back to his Tribe. At a more leisure moment I shall do myself the honor to transmit a more particular account of the action and of our previous movements and am with the highest respect, Sir,

Your Humble Servant,
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

The Honorable
William Eustis,
Secretary of War.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Vincennes, 18th Nov. 1811.

Sir,

In my letter of the 8th Instant I did myself the Honor to communicate the result of an action between the Troops under my command and the confederation of Indians under the control of the Shawanoe Prophet. I had previously informed you in a letter of the 2nd Instant of my proceedings previously to my arrival at the Vermilion River where I had erected a block house for the protection of the boats which I was obliged to leave and as a depositary for our heavy baggage and such part of our provisions as we were unable to transport in waggons. On the morning of the 3rd inst., I commenced my march from the block house. The Wabash above this turning considerably to the Eastward I was obliged in order to avoid the broken and woody country which borders upon it to change my course to the westward of north to gain the prairies which lie to the back of those woods. At the end of one days march I was enabled to take the proper direction (N. E.) which brought me on the evening of the 5th to a small creek at about eleven miles from the Prophet's Town. I had on the preceding day avoided the dangerous pass of Pine Creek by circling a few miles to the left where the Troops and wagons were crossed with expedition and

safety. Our route on the 6th for about six miles lay through prairies separated by small points of woods.

My order of march hitherto had been similar to that used by General Wayne—that is, the Infantry were in two columns of files on either side of the road and the mounted Rifle men and Cavalry in Front in the rear and on the flanks. Where the ground was unfavourable for the action of Cavalry they were placed in the rear, but where it was otherwise they were made to exchange positions with one of the mounted Rifle Corps. Understanding that the last four miles were open woods and the probability being greater that we should be attacked in front than on either flank, I halted at that distance from the Town and formed the Army in order of battle. The United States Infantry placed in the center, two Companies of Militia Infantry and one of Mounted Riflemen on each flank formed the front line. In the rear of this line was placed the baggage drawn up as compactly as possible and immediately behind it a reserve of three Companies of Militia Infantry. The Cavalry formed a second line at the distance of three hundred yards in the rear of the front line and a Company of Mounted Riflemen the advanced guard at that distance in front. To facilitate the march the whole were then broken off in short columns of Companies, a situation the most favorable for forming in order of battle with facility and precision. Our march was slow and cautious and much delayed by the examination of every place which seemed calculated for an ambuscade. Indeed the ground was for some time so unfavorable that I was obliged to change the position of the several Corps three times in the distance of a mile. At half past two o'clock we passed a small Creek at the distance of one mile and a half from the Town, and entered an open wood when the army was halted and again drawn up in order of battle. During the whole of the last days march parties of Indians were constantly about us and every effort was made by the Interpreter to speak to them but in vain. New attempts of the kind were now made but proving equally ineffectual a Capt. Dubois of the Spies and Guides offering to go with a Flag to the Town I dispatched him with an Interpreter to request a conference with the Prophet. In a few moments a message was sent by Capt. Dubois to inform me that in his attempt to advance the Indians appeared on both his flanks and altho he had spoken to them in the most friendly manner they refused to answer but beckoned to him to forward and constantly endeavoured to cut him off from the Army. Upon this information I recalled the Capt. and determined to encamp for the night and take some other measure for opening a conference with the Prophet. Whilst I was engaged in tracing the lines for the encampment Major Daveiss who commanded the Dragoons came to inform me that he had penetrated to the Indian fields that the ground was entirely open and favorable, that the

Indians in front had manifested nothing but hostility and had answered every attempt to bring them to a parley with contempt and insolence. I was immediately advised by all the Officers around me to move forward. A similar wish indeed pervaded all the army. It was drawn up in excellent order and every man appeared eager to decide the contest immediately. Being informed that a good encampment might be had upon the Wabash I yielded to what appeared the general wish and directed the Troops to advance, taking care however to place the interpreter in Front with directions to invite a conference with any Indians they might meet with. We had not advanced above four hundred yards when I was informed that three Indians had approached the advanced Guard and had expressed a wish to speak to me. I found upon their arrival that one of them was a man in great estimation with the Prophet. He informed me that the Chiefs were much surprised at my advancing upon them so rapidly, that they were given to understand by the Delawares and Miamies whom I had sent to them a few days before that I would not advance to their Town until I had received an answer to my demands made through them. That the answer had been dispatched by the Potawatomie Chief Winemac who had accompanied the Miamies and Delawares on their return. That they had left the Prophet's Town two days before with a design to meet me but had unfortunately taken the road on the south side of the Wabash. I answered that I had no intention of attacking them until I discovered that they would not comply with the demands which I had made. That I would go on and encamp at the Wabash and in the morning would have an interview with the Prophet and his Chiefs and explain to them the determination of the President. That in the mean time no hostilities should be committed. He seemed much pleased with this and promised that it should be observed on their part. I then resumed my march. We struck the cultivated grounds about five hundred yards below the Town but as these extended to the bank of the Wabash there was no possibility of getting an encampment which was provided with both wood and water. My Guides and Interpreters being still with the advanced Guard and taking the direction of the Town the Army followed and had advanced within about 150 yards when 50 or 60 Indians sallied out and with loud exclamations called to the Cavalry and to the Militia Infantry which were on our right flank to halt. I immediately advanced to the Front caused the army to halt and directed an Interpreter to request some of the Chiefs to come to me. In a few moments the man who had been with me before made his appearance. I informed him that my object for the present was to procure a good piece of ground to incamp on where we could get wood and water. He informed me that there was a Creek to the Northwest which he thought would suit our purpose. I immediately dispatched two officers to examine it and they reported that the

situation was excellent. I then took leave of the Chief and a mutual promise was again made for suspension of hostilities until we could have an interview on the following day. I found the ground destined for the encampment not altogether such as I could wish it. It was indeed admirably calculated for the encampment of Regular Troops that were opposed to Regulars but it afforded great facility to the approach of Savages. It was a piece of dry Oak Land rising about ten feet above the level of a marshy prairie in Front (towards the Indian Town) and nearly twice that height above a similar prairie in the rear, through which and near to the bank ran a small stream clothed with willows and other brush wood. Towards the left flank this bench of high land widened considerably but became gradually narrower in the opposite direction and at the distance of one hundred and fifty yards from the right flank terminated in an abrupt point. The two columns of Infantry occupied the front and rear of this ground at the distance of about one hundred and fifty yards from each other on the left and something more than half that distance on the right flank. These flanks were filled up, the first by two Companies of Mounted Riflemen amounting to about one hundred and twenty men under the command of Major General Wells of the Kentucky Militia who served as a Major the other by Spencers Company of Mounted Riflemen which amounted to eighty men. The front line was composed of one Battalion of United States Infantry under the command of Major Floyd, flanked on the right by two Companies of Militia and on the left by one Company. The rear line was composed of a Battalion of United States Troops under the command of Capt. Baen acting as Major and four Companies of Militia Infantry under Lieut. Col. Decker. The Regular Troops of this line joined the mounted Riflemen under Gen. Wells on the left flank and Col. Deckers battalion formed an angle with Spencers Company on the left.

Two Troops of Dragoons amounting to in the aggregate about sixty men were encamped in the rear of the left Flank and Capt. Parkers Troops which was larger than the other two in the rear of the front line. Our order of encampment varied little from that above described excepting when some peculiarity of the ground made it necessary. For a night attack the order of encampment was the order of battle and each man slept immediately opposite to his post in the line. In the formation of my Troops I used a single rank or what is called Indian file, because in Indian Warfare where there is no shock to resist one rank is nearly as good as two and in that kind of warfare the extention of line is a matter of the first importance. Raw Troops also manoeuvred with much more facility in single than in double ranks. It was my constant custom to assemble all the field officers at my Tent every evening by signal to give them the watch word and their instructions for the night. Those given

for the night of the 6th were that each Corps which formed a part of the exterior line of the encampment should hold its own ground until relieved. The Dragoons were directed to parade dismounted in case of a night attack with their pistols in their belts and to act as a Corps de reserve. The Camp was defended by two Captains Guards consisting each of four non commissioned officers and 42 privates and two subalterns guards of twenty non commissioned officers and privates. The whole under the command of a field officer of the day. The Troops were regularly called up an hour before day and made to continue under arms until it was quite light. On the morning of the 7th I had risen at a quarter after 4 o'clock and the signal for calling out the men would have been given in two minutes when the attack commenced. It began on our left flank but a single gun was fired by the centinals or by the guard in that direction which made not the least resistance but abandoned their officer and fled into Camp, and the first notice which the Troops of that flank had of the danger was from the yells of the Savages within a short distance of the line, but even under those circumstances the men were not wanting to themselves or to the occasion. Such of them as were awake or were easily awakened seized their arms and took their stations, others which were more tardy had to contend with the enemy in the doors of their tents. The storm first fell upon Capt. Barton's Company of the 4th U. S. Regiment and Capt. Geiger's Company of Mounted Riflemen which formed the left angle of the rear line. The fire upon these was excessively severe and they suffered considerably before relief could be brought to them. Some few Indians passed into the encampment near the angle and one or two penetrated to some distance before they were killed. I believe all the other companies were under arms and tolerably formed before they were fired on. The morning was dark and cloudy, our fires afforded a partial light which if it gave us some opportunity of taking our positions was still more advantageous to the enemy affording them the means of taking a surer aim. They were therefore extinguished as soon as possible. Under all these discouraging circumstances the Troops (nineteen twentieths of whom had never been in action before) behaved in a manner that can never be too much applauded. They took their places without noise and with less confusion than could have been expected from Veterans placed in a similar situation. As soon as I could mount my Horse I rode to the Angle that was attacked. I found that Bartons Company had suffered severely and the left of Geigers entirely broken. I immediately ordered Cooks Company and the late Capt. Wentworths under Lieut. Peters be brought up from the center of the rear line where the ground was much more defensible and formed a cross the angle in support of Bartons and Geigers. My attention was there engaged by a heavy firing upon the left of the front line where were stationed the small company of U. S. Rifle-

men (then however armed with muskets) and the Companies of Baen, Snelling and Prescott of the 4th Regiment I found Major Daveiss forming the Dragoons in the rear of those Companies and understanding that the heaviest part of the enemies' fire proceeded from some trees about fifteen or twenty paces in front of those Companies I directed the Major to dislodge them with a part of the Dragoons. Unfortunately the Majors Gallantry determined him to execute the Order with a smaller force than was sufficient which enabled the enemy to avoid him in front and attack his flanks. The Major was mortally wounded and his party driven back. The Indians were however immediately and gallantly dislodged from their advantageous position by Capt. Snelling at the head of his Company. In the course of a few minutes after the commencement of the attack the fire extended along the left flank the whole of the front the right flank and part of the rear line. Upon Spencers mounted Riflemen and the right of Warwicks Company which was posted on the right of the rear line it was excessively severe. Capt. Spencer and his first and second Lieutenants were killed and Capt. Warwick mortally wounded Those Companies however still bravely maintained their posts, but Spencers had suffered so severely and having originally too much ground to occupy I reinforced them with Robbs Company of Riflemen which had been driven or by mistake ordered from their position on the left flank towards the center of the Camp and filled the vacancy that had been occupied by Robb with Prescotts Company of the 4th U. S. Regiment. My great object was to keep the lines entire to prevent the enemy from breaking into the Camp until daylight should enable me to make a general and effectual change. With this view I had reinforced every part of the line that had suffered much and as soon as the approach of morning discovered itself I withdrew from the front line Snellings, Poseys (under Lieut. Albright) and Scotts and from the rear line Wilsons Companies and drew them up upon the left flank and at the same time I ordered Cooks and Baens Companies the former from the rear and the latter from the front line to reinforce the right flank foreseeing that at these points the enemy would make their last efforts. Major Wells who commanded on the left flank not knowing my intentions precisely had taken the command of these Companies and charged the enemy before. I had formed the body of Dragoons with which I meant to support the Infantry a small detachment of those were however ready and proved amply sufficient for the purpose. The Indians were driven by the Infantry at the point of the Bayonet and the Dragoons pursued and forced them into a marsh where they could not be followed. Capt. Cook and Lieut. Laribee had agreeably to my Order marched their Companies to the right flank had formed them under the fire of the enemy and being then joined by the Riflemen of that flank had charged the Indians killed a number and put the rest to a precipitate

flight. A favorable opportunity was here offered to pursue the enemy with Dragoons but being engaged at that time on the other flank I did not observe it until it was too late.

I have thus Sir given you the particulars of an action which was certainly maintained with the greatest obstinacy and perseverance by both parties. The Indians manifested a ferocity uncommon even with them—to their savage fury our Troops opposed that cool and deliberate valour which is characteristic of the Christian Soldier.

The more pleasing part of my duty (that of naming to you the Corps and Individuals who particularly distinguished themselves) is yet to be performed. There is however considerable difficulty in it. Where merit was so common it is almost impossible to discriminate.

The whole of the Infantry formed a small Brigade under the immediate Orders of Col. Boyd. The Colonel throughout the action manifested equal zeal and bravery in carrying into execution my orders, in keeping the men to their posts and exhorting them to fight with valour. His Brigade Major Clark and his Aid de Camp George Croghan Esq. were also very serviceably employed. Col. Joseph Bartholomew a very valuable officer commanded under Col. Boyd the Militia Infantry. He was wounded early in the action and his services lost to me. Major G. R. C. Floyd the senior officer of the 4th U. S. Regiment commanded immediately the Battalion of that Regiment which was in the Front line; his conduct during the action was entirely to my satisfaction. Lieut Col. Decker who commanded the Battalion of Militia on the right of the rear line preserved his command in good order. He was however but partially attacked. I have before mentioned to you that Major General Wells of the 4th Division of Kentucky Militia acted under my command as a Major at the Head of two Companies of Mounted Volunteers the General maintained the fame which he had already acquired in almost every campaign and in almost every battle which has been fought with the Indians since the settlement of Kentucky. Of the several Corps the 4th U. S. Regiment and the two small companies attached to it were certainly the most conspicuous for undaunted valour. The Companies commanded by Captain Cook, Snelling and Barton, Lieutenants Larabee, Peters and Hawkins were placed in situations where they could render more service and encounter more danger, and those officers eminently distinguished themselves. Captains Prescott and Brown performed their duty also entirely to my satisfaction as did Posey's Company of the 7th Regiment headed by Lieut. Albright. In short Sir they supported the fame of American Regulars and I have never heard that a single individual was found out of the line of his duty. Several of the Militia Companies were in no wise inferior to the Regulars. Spencers, Geigers and Warwicks maintained their posts amidst a monstrous carnage. As indeed

did Robbs after it was posted on the left flank. Its loss of men (17 killed and wounded) and keeping its ground is sufficient evidence of its firmness. Wilsons and Scotts Companies charged with the Regular Troops and proved themselves worthy of doing so. Norris's company also behaved well. Hargroves and Welkins Company were placed in a situation where they had no opportunity of distinguishing themselves or I am satisfied they would have done it. This was the case with the squadron of Dragoons also. After Major Daveiss had received his wound, knowing it to be mortal I promoted Captain Parke to the Majority than whom there is no better officer.

My two aids de Camp Majors Hurst and Taylor with Lieut. Adams of the 4th Regiment the adjutant of the Troops afforded me the most essential aid as well in the action as throughout the campaign.

The arrangements of Capt. Piatt in the Quarter Masters department were highly judicious and his exertions on all occasions particularly in bringing off the wounded deserve my warmest thanks. But in giving merited praise to the living let me not forget the gallant dead. Col. Abraham Owen* commandant of the 18' Kentucky Regiment joined me a few days before the action as a private in Capt. Geigers Company. He accepted the appointment of Volunteer aid de Camp to me. He fell early in the action. The Representatives of his State will inform you that she possessed not a better citizen nor a braver man. Major J. D. Daveiss was known as an able Lawyer and a great Orator. He joined me as a private Volunteer and on the recommendation of the officers of that Corps was appointed to command the 3 Troops of Dragoons. His conduct in that capacity justified their choice. Never was there an officer possessed of more ardour and zeal to discharge his duties with propriety and never one who would have encountered greater danger to purchase military fame. Captain Baen of the 4th U. S. Regiment was killed early in the action. He was unquestionable a good officer and valiant soldier. Captains Spencer, Warwick and Lieutenants McMahon and Berry were all my particular friends. I have ever had the utmost confidence in their valour and I was not deceived. Spencer was wounded in the head, he exhorted his men to fight valiantly, he was shot through both thighs and fell still continuing to encourage them, he was raised up and received a ball through his body which put an immediate end to his existance. Warwick was shot immediately through the body; being taken to

*Col. Abraham Owen was born in Virginia in 1769 and migrated to Kentucky in 1785. He was in Wilkinson's campaign in the summer of 1791 upon the White and Wabash Rivers. He was in St. Clair's defeat Nov. 4, 1791, being wounded at that engagement. He was in the expedition led by Hardin to the White River and took part in the action which routed the Indians from their hunting camps. He was a member of the legislature of Kentucky and in 1799 was chosen a member of the Constitutional Convention. Shortly before his death he was a member of the state senate. *Filson Club, No. 15, page 64.*

the surgery to be dressed as soon as it was over; being a man of great bodily vigor and still able to walk, he insisted upon going back to head his Company although it was evident that he had but a few hours to live.

All these Gentlemen Sir, Capt. Baen excepted, have left wives and five of them large families of children. This is the case too with many of the privates among the Militia who fell in the action or who have died since of their wounds. Will the bounty of their Country be with held from their helpless Orphans, many of whom will be in the most destitute condition and perhaps want even the necessaries of life. With respect to the number of Indians that were engaged against us I am possessed of no data by which I can form a correct statement. It must however have been considerable and perhaps not much inferior to our own, which deducting the Dragoons who were unable to do much service was very little above seven hundred non commissioned officers and privates. I am convinced there were at least six hundred. The Prophet had three weeks before four hundred and fifty of his own proper followers. I am induced to believe that he was joined by a number of the lawless vagabonds who live on the Illinois River as large trails were seen coming from that direction. Indeed I shall not be surprised to find that some of those who professed the warmest friendship for us were arrayed against us—tis certain that one of their description came out from the Town and spoke to me the night before the action. The Potawatemie Chief whom I mentioned to have been wounded and taken prisoner in my letter of the 8th Instant I left in the battle grounds, after having all the care of him in my power. I requested him to inform those of his own Tribe who had joined the Prophet and the Kickapoos and Winebagoes that if they would immediately abandon the Prophet and return to their own Tribes their past conduct would be forgiven and that we would treat them as we formerly had done. He assured me that he would do so and that there was no doubt of their compliance. Indeed he said that he was certain that they would put the Prophet to death. I think upon the whole that there will be no further hostilities but of this I shall be enabled to give you some more certain information in a few days.

The Troops left the battle ground on the 9th Instant. It took every wagon to transport the wounded. We managed however to bring off the public property altho almost all the private baggage of the officers was necessarily destroyed.

It may perhaps be imagined Sir that some means might have been adopted to have made a more early discovery of the approach of the enemy to our camp the morning of the 7th inst., but if I had employed two thirds of the Army as out posts it would have been ineffectual—the Indians in such a night would have found means to have passed between them—placed in the situation that we were there is no other mode of avoiding a surprise than by a

chain of centinels so close together that the enemy cannot pass between without discovery and having the army in such readiness that they can get to their alarm posts at a moments warning. Our Troops would not have been better prepared than they were unless they had been kept under arms the whole night, as they lay with their accoutrements on and their arms by their sides and the moment they were up they were at their posts. If the centinels and the guards had done their duty even the Troops on the left flank would have been prepared to receive the Indians.

I have the Honor to inclose you a correct return of our killed and wounded. The wounded suffered very much before their arrival here but they are now comfortably fixed and every attention has been and shall continue to be paid to them. Doctor Foster is not only possessed of great professional merit but is moreover a man of feeling and honor.

I am convinced Sir that the Indians lost many more men than we did. They left from thirty six to forty on the field. They were seen to take off not only the wounded but the dead. An Indian that was killed and scalped in the beginning of the action by one of our men was found in a House in the Town. Several others were also found in the Houses and many graves which were fresh dug. One of them was opened and found to contain three dead bodies.

Our Infantry used principally cartridges containing twelve buck shot which were admirably calculated for a night action.

I have before informed you Sir that Col. Miller was prevented by illness from going on the expedition. He rendered essential service in the command of Fort Harrison. He is an officer of great merit.

There are so many circumstances which it is important for you to know respecting the situation of this Country that I have thought it best to commit this dispatch to my aid de Camp Major Taylor who will have the honor of delivering it to you and who will be able to give you more satisfaction than I could do by writing. Major Taylor (who is also one of our Supreme Judges) is a man of integrity and Honor and you may rely upon any statements he may make.

With the Highest Respect I have the Honor to be Sir,

Your Humble Servant,

William Henry Harrison.

P. S. Not a man of ours was taken prisoner and of the three scalps which were taken two of them were recovered.

The Honorable
W. Eustis
Secretary of War.

Testimonial of Harrison's Bravery.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

The undersigned, Field Officers, during the action at the Tippecanoe on the morning of the 7th Inst., desirous of stating their opinions with respect to the conduct of the Commander in Chief on that occasion, do hereby certify that the Governor was calm and deliberate—that his orders were precise and distinct—that he performed duties that might have been devolved on subordinates—that he directed and marched reinforcements to points where aid was necessary and posted them himself—that he never avoided the post of danger—That the victory was obtained by his vigilance and activity. In a word that his conduct in every respect was worthy the General and the soldier.

Given this 19th Nov. 1811.

JOSEPH BARTHOLOMEW,
Col. 2nd Indiana Regiment.
LUKE DECKER,
Col. 4th Ind. Regt. Infantry.
G. R. C. FLOYD, Major
4th U. S. Inf. Comdg. Regt.
SAMUEL WELLS,* Major Gen. of the
6th Division of the Kentucky
Militia now a Major of the Mounted
Riflemen Indiana Territory.
B. PARKE, Major of Light Dragoons.
NOAH PURCELL, Major 4th Ind. Regiment.

I do hereby certify that the above was correctly copied from the Original by me.

H. HURST, A. D. C.

[ENCLOSURE]

List of Killed and Wounded of the 4th U. S. Regiment in the Action with the Indians on the 7th November, 1811, Wabash River.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Captain Wentworth's Company.
Wounded, Lieut. George P. Peters
Cop'l, Solomon Johnson
Privates, Curtis Phipps
" Charles Wait
" William Layman

*Samuel Wells was a native of Virginia who came to Kentucky at an early day. He became a major of mounted volunteers in 1793 and major of a battalion of volunteer riflemen in 1811. He was made colonel in the 17th Infantry March 12, 1812, and honorably discharged June 1, 1814. *Heitman's Hist. Reg.*, etc.

Privates, Caleb Critchet
" Jacob Keyser
" Noah Furnald
" Joseph Burdett
" Stanton Smilie
" Nath'l Harris
" Isaac M. Nute—died since
Killed, " William H. King.

13

Captain Baen Company.

Wounded, Captain William C. Baen—died since.
Private, Dexter Earl—died since
" Sylvester Dean
" John Donahue
" Timothy Foster
" John D. Jones
" Daniel Rodman
" John Mahannah
" Francis Nelson
" Isaac Rathbone

10

Captain Snellings Company

Wounded, Private Selathiel Hathaway*
" Goodenaw†
Killed, " Joseph Tibbetts

3

Captain R. B. Browns Company.

Wounded, Private Augustus Bradford
" Bliss Lovell
" John Yeoman—died since

3

Late Captain Welches Company (under Com'd Capt. Barton).‡

Wounded, Lieut. George Gooding
Sergeant Montgomery Orr§
Corp. John Rice
Private, Jona. Crowell—died since
" Daniel Gillman—died since
" Stephen Pettis
" William Pomroy
" Lucius Sallis
" James Stepheson¶
" Samuel Tibbetts
Killed, Corp'l James Mitchell
" David L. Thompson
Private Levi Cory

13

Filson Club, No. 15, page 125. Alanson Hathaway.

†Rufus Goodenough.

‡Should be Burton. See *Filson Club, No. 15, page 130.*

§Montgomery Orr gave his version of the attack before he died and it is printed in *Walker's Journal of Two Campaigns, etc., page 25.*

¶Stevenson, Stephenson.

Captain Bartons Company.

Wounded Private David Carnes‖—died since
" Lewis Taylor "
" Lemon E. Welch "
" John Clark
" Robert Douglass
" William Foster
" Samuel Souther
" William Turner

8

Captain Prescott Company.

Wounded Private John Sanborn—died since.

1

Captain Cooks Company.

Wounded Sergeant Harvey Munn.
Private Nathan Snow—died since
" Dennison Crumley*
" Robert Thompson
" Charles Coger†
" Wm. M. Saunderson
" Daniel Rogers
" Amos Roice—died since
" Daniel Lee—died since

9

Lieut. Albrights Detachment‡

Wounded Sergeant Alicott Babbet
" Nathan Fairbanks
Privates Samuel Potter
" Lewis Mangum
" Elisha Napp
Killed " Israel Butler

6

Late Whitneys Company Rifle.

Wounded Ensign Henry Burchsted§
Sergt. Reuben Newton
" Aaron Furbush
Private Eben. T. Andrews
" William Brigham¶
" Ephraim Hall
" Israel Newhall

‖*Filson Club, No. 15,* gives his name "David Kerns"; *Walker's Journal of Two Campaigns* gives it "Kearness."

*Dennison Crumley (Crumby) died of his wounds, Dec. 28.

†Charles Croger died of his wounds, Dec. 3.

‡Jacob W. Albright, 2nd lieutenant of the 1st Infantry, commanding a company of the 7th Infantry.

§*Filson Club, No. 15,* gives the name Nurchsted.

¶William Brigham died in the hospital, Dec. 4. He gave his statement, which is printed in *Walker's Journal, etc., page 27.*

Private Edward R. Tuck‖
" Samuel Thing▲
Musician Adam Walker♦
Killed, Private Ira T. Trowbridge.
11

Killed in the Action, 2 Corporals and 5 Privates; died since of wounds, 1 Captain and 12 Privates; Wounded now in Hospital, 57. Total 77.

J. L. EASTMAN,
A. Adjutant 4th Regt. Infantry.

Fort Knox,
November 19th 1811.

[ENCLOSURE]

Report of the Sick, Wounded and Invalids of the United States Troops in the General Hospital at Vincennes and of the Sick in Quarters of Three Companies Stationed in Town.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

	Names.	Where Wounded or what Disease	Remarks.
1.	Hall	Arm Fract.	
2.	Newhall	Side	
3.	Tuck	Thigh	
4.	Thing	Thigh	
5.	Orr, Sergt.	Body	
6.	Rice, Corp.	Thigh and Hand	
7.	Tibbetts	Thigh	
8.	Pomroy	Thigh	
9.	Johnson	Thigh	
10.	Smiley	Arm	
11.	Wait	Side	
12.	Rodman	Hand	
13.	Dunehue	Thigh	
14.	Mahannah	Arm Amptd.	Dangerous
15.	Dean	Arm Amptd.	Dangerous
16.	Lovelle	Thigh Amptd.	
17.	Crumley	Thigh Amptd.	
18.	Santhers	Leg	
19.	Clark	Arm	
20.	Goodnauh	Hand	
21.	Harris	Arm Fract.	
22.	Douglass	Loins	
23.	Potter	Body	
24.	Mangam	Leg	

‖Edward R. Suck and ▲Samuel Hing. Both *Filson Club, No. 15,* and *Walker's Journal* give the names thus.

♦Adam Walker, the musician, who wrote the *Journal of Two Campaigns of the Fourth Regiment of the U. S. Infantry in the Michigan and Indiana Territories under the Command of Col. John P. Boyd and Lieut. Col. James Miller during the Years 1811 and 1812.*

	Names	Wounds & Diseases	Remarks
	MILITIA		
25.	Mahan	" Privates	
26.	Bateman	Arm Amptd.	
27.	Minor	Leg Amptd.	
28.	Weathers	Thigh	
29.	Ruskirk	Side	
30.	Collins	Leg	
	U. S. TROOPS SICK IN HOSPITAL.		
31.	King	Debility	
32.	Emmerson	"	
33.	Clark	Fever Intermittent	
34.	Hilyard	"	
35.	McDuffy	"	
36.	Walden	Pneumonia	
37.	Peterson	"	Very Sick.
	SICK IN QUARTERS.		
38.	Colby	Cold	
39.	Parker	Diarrhea	
40.	Wells	Diarrhea	
41.	Griffen	Fev. Intermittent	
42.	Herdy	Diarrhea	
43.	Watson	Diarrhea	
44.	Mears	Diarrhea	
45.	Smyth	Diarrhea	
46.	Rice	Debility	
47.	Knights	"	
48.	Pierce	"	All the sick and wounded opposite whose names no remark is made are considered safe and convalescent.
49.	Greeny	Slight Wound	
50.	Bradford	"	

JOSIAH D. FOSTER, Sergn. 4th Reg.
HOSEA BLOOD, A. Assist. Surgeon, 4th Reg. Inf.

Josiah Snelling to William Henry Harrison, Enclosed in Letter to William Eustis, Nov. 26, 1811.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Fort Harrison, Nov. 20th 1811.

Sir,

Mr. Dubois a young man in the Contractor, being about to make a journey to Vincennes, has offered me an opportunity of communicating to your Excellency the substance of a conversation I had with Little Eyes a Chief of the Miami Tribe who visited me yesterday. He informed me that when the Delawares went with your last message to the Prophet's Town he accompanied them and with them returned in expectation of meeting you, until they discovered that you had crossed the River. They followed and on the morning of the action were in camped about one mile from us where they distinctly heard the report

of our guns; after the action was over (as he says) he proposed to his companions that they should come to our camp but this proposal was rejected through that the Kentucky people not knowing them for friends might shoot them—he therefore went to the Prophet's town where he found the Indians very much exasperated at their loss and reproaching the Prophet in bitter terms for the defeat he had brought upon them, accusing him of the murder of their friends who had fallen, etc. It seems that after pronouncing some incantations over a composition he had prepared on the night preceding the action, he assured them that by the power of his art half the Army was already dead and the other half bewildered or in a state of distraction, and they had nothing to do but rush into the Camps and complete the work of distruction—(a few words blurred)

You are a liar, said one of the Winebagoes to him, for you told us that the white people were dead or crazy when they were all in their senses and fought like the Devil. He appeared much crest fallen, or as Little Eyes described it, held his head down between his knees, but attempted to pacify them by saying that the virtue of his composition was lost, in consequence of it being with his wife the time of her monthly visitation, which circumstance he was unacquainted with until after the action and earnestly intreated them to suffer him once more to try his skill but notwithstanding his intreaties they bound him with cords and it was the opinion of Little Eyes they would sacrifice him. The little kickapoo who spoke in council at Vincennes would have shared his fate had he not made his escape. Parties of their young men were daily out in pursuit of him. When they evacuated their Town they marched only twenty miles and encamped on the waters of Wild Cat Paunch Creek where they now are. The Potowatomies Chief who was left wounded on the Ground made a faithful report of what you said to him and it appeared to have a good effect upon them. All the confederated Tribes had abandoned their faith in the Prophet except about forty Shawanose who still adhered to him. Many of their warriors remained very sick who were wounded with buck shot, four of them were wounded with a sabre, two severely, from the account given I imagine by Capt. Baen. Little Eyes says they told him, one of them had shot a soldier and was stooping to scalp him when he received a severe wound on his posterior from a stout warrior who was immediately surrounded and slain by four others, but not before he had wounded them all, one of them with his pistol which shot away all the flesh and muscles from the upper part of his arm of which wound he died the next day.

It gives me pain to inform your Excellency that the bodies of our deceased friends were the next day dispossessed of their graves and the slain Indians supplied their places and it is still

more to be regretted that they should have occasion to plead the white mens example who they said had disturbed the graves of their dead. Little Eyes said a Winebagoe told him they found fifty slain which was contradicted, but I suspect by the shrewd looks of the Indians when I spoke that he had occular demonstration of the fact.

He requested me to tell his father the Governor that he was convinced he was a good and true man that you had told them you would go to the Prophet's Town but that you would not turn aside to the right or left to injure your children the Miamis which promise you had faithfully kept, while the Prophet had told them nothing but lies. He also wished me to inform your Excellency that in about twenty days there would be a great Council of the Delawares Potowatomies Hurons and Miamis at a place about sixty miles from this port for the purpose of talking of good things, that it was their desire to become one people and live in perpetual peace with the United States.

The Chippeways and Ottaways were to meet at the same time on the waters of Tippecanoe river, that it was their intention to send a deputation to Vincennes to inform your Excellency of the result of their Council and hear a talk from you. He represented to me that he was in a suffering condition for want of powder and earnestly requested a small supply. I told him it was not in my power to furnish him nor could I suffer him to purchase it of any person in the Garrison until I had received your instructions on the subject. Mons. Breulette informs me that just as Little Eyes was about to depart he told him that Lapouser, Negro Legs, Stone eater, Pecan, the Big Chief, Lorain & Gamelin say they will not receive annuities from the U. S. because they like their Land too much to part with it; all the rest of the Chiefs are willing to take.

I know not but all these things I have related may be mere trifles, but believing your Excellency knows much better than myself in what estimation to hold them I conceive I should be wanting in my duty did I not communicate them.

Suffer me to intrude on your patience one moment more and I have done. I observed in your instructions that I was occasionally to furnish the Indians who visited me with provisions, have I authority to draw on the Contractor for them and if so, does it extend to whiskey and tobacco.

With sentiments of the Highest respect

I am your Excellency's most Humble Servant,

J. SNELLING, Capt.
4th R. Inf.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Vincennes, 26th Nov. 1811.

Sir,

Before this reaches you I hope you will have received from the hands of my Aid de Camp Major Taylor my official account of the late action with the Indians. Upon examining my letter to you of the 3rd Inst. I find that I had omitted to mention the circumstance of my having sent another mission of Indians to the Prophet after the return of the Deleware Chiefs. The day that the Army left Fort Harrison I remained behind for some hours for the purpose of holding a conference with the Deleware and Miamis Chiefs as I had no reason to doubt the information I had received of the intention of the Prophet to burn the first prisoner he should take and was apprehensive I should find much difficulty in opening a communication with him as my interpreters had become so alarmed that I could scarcely get them to the front of the Army. I proposed to the Delawares that they should send three or four of their young men with me to be the bearers of another Speech to the Prophet, they agreed to the proposal and the Miamies then offered to go with all their chiefs and young men to make another effort to induce the Prophet to comply with my demands. I assented to their offer excepting as to the number of persons to be employed. I wanted only a few to go, they were extremely desirous of going *en masse* and I was obliged preemptorily to declare that not more than twenty four should go. This number was at length agreed on. The demands which they were to make to the Shawanoes were that "the Winebagoes, Potawatomies and Kickapoos who were with him should return to their respective Tribes. That all the stolen horses in his possession should be delivered up—that the murderers of our Citizens should either be given up or satisfactory proof given that they were not nor had not lately been under his control." I did not think proper to say anything at that time upon the subject of Hostages. I have never had any account of these Indians until I received the inclosed letter from Capt. Snelling whom I left in command of Fort Harrison—the account given to the Capt. of the course pursued by them is most assuredly false and I should not be surprised to find that our good friends the Miamis assisted the Prophet not only with their councils but with their guns—during the whole of the engagement a shower of balls was poured into our encampment from persons who were at a considerable distance from us in the marshy Prairie in front. They were either cowards who did not wish to come into danger or persons who did not wish to be discovered. I have determined however

to dissemble my suspicions—and if possible prevent any further hostilities. I fear however that the rashness of our own Citizens may defeat my intentions. They are prodigiously exasperated and the raising of our dead will make them more so. To insure their forbearance I have commanded, threatened and ———— I have written to Governor Edwards and Gen. Clark to request them to send speeches to the Kickapoos of the Prairie urging them to withdraw their warriors from the Prophet and I have dispatched an Express to Fort Wayne with instructions to Messrs. Shaw and Wells.

I left Capt. Snelling in the command of Fort Harrison with his own and Poseys Company. The two at that time making little more than fifty present fit for duty. The rest of the Regular Troops are in quarters in Fort Knox and in this Town. The Militia that were employed upon the expedition have all been mustered and discharged but I have thought it expedient to retain a company of Mounted Riflemen amounting to about fifty which had been turned out a few days before I arrived here to patrol round the settlements. They are posted at Bosseron twenty miles above this and are still employed in that service. I fear if the other Indians commit no depredations that the Winebagoes before their departure may break into our settlements and steal horses if not take scalps. To make it the interest of the Miamis and Potawatomies to get these fellows out of the Country as speedily as possible I have informed them through Messrs. Wells and Shaw that if we were obliged to send another Army against them we would keep as our own the Country which we should drive them from. I am at a loss to know what to require of them in regard to the Prophet—whether to insist upon his being given up—put to death or driven off. The objection to the latter is that he may establish himself elsewhere, but this I am certain will never happen in a manner to be productive of much injury. The veil under which he has practiced his impostures has been completely rent and must discover his true character to the most ignorant of the Indians. He has indeed by his avowed determination to stop the progress of our settlements acquired an astonishing popularity amongst all the Tribes—a few Chiefs excepted who were personally opposed to him perhaps there was not an Indian who did not wish well to his cause and hence I suspect that altho his warriors were in the front of the late action it will be found that he was supported by an host of those who call themselves our friends. Nothing proves more clearly the treachery of the measures than the false information they gave me—they asserted positively that the Potawatomies had abandoned the Prophet whereas the fact is that they had obtained an accession of strength from that Tribe. All the information I receive from the Indian Country I shall immediately transmit to you that the President may be master to determine the course which is to be pursued. Under the circumstances in which the Country

is placed I have thought it expedient to retain the command of the Regular Troops as well as the Militia and have directed Capt. Snelling to receive his orders from me.

All the muster rolls of the Militia Companies will be forwarded immediately to the accomptants office. I have never known what pay is allowed to Dragoons when they furnish their own horses, I promised the Mounted Riflemen that they should receive the same. If I am not mistaken there is a law which provides for the payment of Horses killed in battle—but I believe not for those which were lost or taken. In the course of the action a number of horses broke loose and ran off and were taken by the Indians—an account of these have been taken as well as of the saddles that were necessarily destroyed. On the morning that the Troops marched from the battle ground two wagons were appropriated to bring off the public property the baggage of the officers and the saddles of those who had lost their horses—it was soon however discovered that it would require every wagon for the wounded—it became therefore necessary to destroy all the private property—and I had no other alternative to save the guns of the killed and wounded men than to oblige each Dragoon to take one. The persons who have lost their horses and saddles in the manner above described flatter themselves that remuneration will be made them by the Government and I most sincerely hope that they may not be disappointed. I am not on this occasion an interested advocate. I lost no horse but one that was shot dead under my Aid de Camp Major Taylor—that is a case which I suppose to be already provided for and with regard to my baggage which was destroyed I shall never make a charge of it. But many of the men are in such circumstances that the loss of a horse and saddle will be severely felt. Every description of Troops which composed my little Army have certainly deserved well of their Country. Not only for their bravery in the field but for their patience under fatigue and hunger exposed too to the inclemency of the weather without tents and many of them without shoes and with clothing by no means suited to the season. I can also state that this is the only campaign in the Western Country in which the Militia were made to work in the erection of forts. For the building of Fort Harrison the militia were regularly detailed with the other Troops and besides their quota they furnished two small parties of Volunteers who were on constant duty at the more particular work of hewing timber and sawing—All the additional expence incurred by the public was for the daily fatigue an extra gill of Whisky per man and for those on constant duty an extra half ration.

I am sorry to inform you that several of the wounded men have died since Major Taylor left this, and several have lost their limbs. By some unaccountable accident no bark has been sent on in the Medicine Posts for the 4th Regt. I was obliged yesterday to send to Louisville for some.

27th. A report reached town yesterday that some mischief had been done by the Indians about 20 miles off—it is however I am confident entirely false.

With great Respect I am, Sir, your Humble Servant,

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

Honorable William Eustis Esq.,
Secretary of War.

Andrew Jackson to Governor W. H. Harrison.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Hermitage, 28th November 1811.

With deep and heart felt regret, I received the information of the loss you sustained, on the morning of the seventh instant, by the attack of the Indians upon your encampment. Upon the receipt of this information, and hearing that you were slowly retreating* I issued orders to my respective Brigades, to hold themselves in readiness to march to your support, in case the safety of your frontier, and your request, might make it necessary and proper.

Should the aid of part of my division be necessary to enable you to revenge the blood of our brave heroes, who fell by the deceitful hands of those unrelenting barbarians, I will with pleasure march with five hundred or one thousand brave Tennesseeans. The *blood* of *our murdered Countrymen must be revenged*. That banditti ought to be swept from the face of the earth. I do hope that Government will see that it is necessary to act efficiently and that this hostile band which must be excited to war, by the secret agents of Great Britain must be destroyed. Should my services be necessary to your safety, and that of your Country, by notifying me thereof and at what point I can meet with supplies, I will have the number required at a short day at the appointed place.

Being called by imperious business from home for a short time, I have directed my aids Major Anderson and Major Coffee, to attend at Nashville, receive letters to my address, and should you require men, to have them ready and prepared to march at my return. You will please address me at Nashville.

Accept assurances of my esteem and respect,

ANDREW JACKSON,† Major General
2 Division Tennessee.

Governor Harrison.

*The first rumors of the battle were not encouraging. Harrison was thought to have been surprised and his sentinels were supposed to have been shot with poisoned arrows. *Niles Register, Vol. II, page 56.*

†Andrew Jackson, the seventh President of the United States, served two terms, 1829-1833, 1833-1837.

William Henry Harrison to William Eustis, Esq. Letter Read in Congress.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

12 Cong. L. 1 Sess.
Gov. Harrison's Letter
of Dec. 4, 1811.
1811
Dec. 19. Read.

Vincennes, 4th Dec. 1811.

Sir,

I have the honor to inform you that two principal Chiefs of the Kickapoos of the prairie arrived here, bearing a flag, on the evening before last. They informed me that they came in consequence of a message from the Chief of that part of the Kickapoos which had joined the Prophet, requiring them to do so, and that the said Chief is to be here himself in a day or two. The account which they gave of the late confederacy under the Prophet is as follows: "The Prophet, with his Shawanoes, is at a small Huron Village about twelve miles from his former residence, on this side of the Wabash, where also were twelve or fifteen Hurons. The Kickapoos are encamped near to the Tippecanoe. The Potawatomies have scattered and gone to different villages of that Tribe. The Winebagoes had all set out on their return to their own Country, excepting one Chief and nine men who remained at their former village. The latter had attended Tecumseh in his tour to the southward and had only returned to the Prophet's town the day before the action. The Prophet had sent a messenger to the Kickapoos of the Prairie, to request that he might be permitted to return to their town. This was positively refused, and a warning sent to him, not to come there. He then sent to request that four of his men might attend the Kickapoo Chief here—this was also refused. These Chiefs say, on the whole, that all the Tribes who lost warriors in the late action, attribute their misfortune to the Prophet alone;—that they constantly reproach him with their misfortunes, and threaten him with death.—That they are all desirous of making their peace with the United States and will send deputations to me for that purpose, as soon as they are informed that they will be well received. The two Chiefs further say that they were sent by Gov. Howard and Gen. Clark, some time before the action, to endeavor to bring off the Kickapoos from the Prophet's Town; that they used their best endeavors to effect it, but unsuccessfully. That the Prophet's followers were fully impressed with a belief that they could defeat us with ease; that it was their intention to have attacked us at Fort Harrison, if we had gone no higher; that Racoon Creek was then fixed on, and finally pine Creek;

and that the latter would probably have been the place, if the usual route had not been abandoned, and a crossing made higher up; That the attack made on our Centinels at Fort Harrison was intended to shut the door against accommodations. That the Winebagoes had forty warriors killed in the action, and the kickapoos eleven and ten wounded. They have never heard how many of the Potawatomies and other Tribes were killed. That the Potawatomie Chief left by me on the battle ground is since dead of his wounds, but that he faithfully delivered my speech to the different Tribes, and warmly urged them to abandon the Prophet and submit to my terms.

I cannot say, Sir, how much of the above may be depended on. I believe, however, that the statement made by the Chief is generally correct, particularly with regard to the present disposition of the Indians. It is certain that our frontiers have never enjoyed more profound tranquility than at this time. No injury of any kind that I can hear of has been done, either to the persons or property of our Citizens. Before the expedition, not a fortnight passed over without some vexatious depredation being committed.

The Kickapoo Chiefs certainly tell an untruth when they say that there were but eleven of their Tribe killed, and ten wounded; it is impossible to believe that fewer were wounded than killed. They acknowledge, however, that the Indians have never sustained so severe a defeat since their acquaintance with the White People.

I have the honor to be with great respect, Sir,

Your humble servant,
(signed) William Henry Harrison.

P. S. The Chief of the Vermillion Kickapoos has this moment arrived.

Honorable
William Eustis Esq.,
Secretary of War.

President Madison's Message, Dec. 18, 1811.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

No. 131.

12 Cong. }
1 Sess. } L.

Message of the P. U. S.
of 18th December communicating
information respecting the
engagement on the Wabash.
1811.

Dec, 18. Read.
Series 2
Doc. No. 131.

To the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States.

I lay before Congress two letters received from Governor Harrison of the Indiana Territory reporting the particulars and the issue of the expedition under his command of which notice was taken in my communication of November 5th.

While it is deeply lamented that so many valuable lives have been lost in the action which took place on the 7th ult., Congress will see with satisfaction the dauntless spirit and fortitude victoriously displayed by every description of the troops engaged, as well as the collected firmness which distinguished their commander, on an occasion requiring the utmost exertions of valor and discipline.

It may reasonably be expected that the good effects of this critical defeat and dispersion of a combination of savages which appears to have been spreading to a greater extent, will be experienced not only in a cessation of the murders and depredations lately committed on our frontier, but in the prevention of any hostile incursions otherwise to have been apprehended.

The families of those brave and patriotic Citizens who have fallen in this severe conflict will doubtless engage the favorable attention of Congress.

James Madison.

Washington, December 18th 1811.

Report of the Killed and Wounded of the 4th U. S. Regiment Infantry in the Action with the Indians of the 7th November, 1811, on the Wabash River.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Companies	Killed							Died since of Wounds							Wounded now in Hospital							
	Captains	Subalterns	Sergeants	Corpl.	Musicians	Privates	Total Killed	Captain	Subaltern	Sergeants	Corpl.	Musicians	Privates	Total died Since of Wounds	Capt.	Subl.	Sergt.	Corpl.	Musicians	Privates	Total in Hospital	Aggregate
Capt. Wentworth						1	1						1	1		1		1		9	11	13
" Cook's													3	3			1			5	6	9
" Prescott													1	1								1
" Brown													1	1						2	2	3
" Snelling						1	1													2	2	3
" Barton													3	3						5	5	8
" Late Welch				2		1	3						2	2		1	1	1		5	8	13
" Albright						1	1										2			3	5	6
" Late Whitney						1										1	2		1	6	10	11
" Baens								1					1	2						8	8	10
Total				2		5	7	1					12	13		3	6	2	1	45	57	77

Fort Knox
November 19th, 1811

J. L. EASTMAN
A. Adjutant
4th Infy.

A General Return of the Killed and Wounded of the Army Under the Command of His Excellency William Henry Harrison, Governor and Commander in Chief of the Indiana Territory, in the Action with the Indians Near Prophet's Town, November 7th, 1811.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

	Killed									Wounded since dead								Wounded									
	Aid de Camp	Lt. Cl.	Majors	Captains	Subalterns	Sergeants	Corporals	Music	Privates	Lt. Colo.	Major	Captains	Subalterns	Sergeants	Corporals	Music	Privates	Lt. Colo.	Adjutant	Surgns. Mate	Captain	Subaltern	Sergeants	Corporals	Music	Privates	Total
General Staff	1																										1
Field and Staff										1								2	1	1							5
U. S. Infantry							2		5			1					14					3	6	2	1	43	77
Colo. Decker's Militia									4			1					1						2			16	24
Major Redman's Militia						1			6								1				1					5	14
Major Daviess's Dragoons									4															1		5	10
Major Well's Mounted Rifl									6								3				1					19	31
Capt. Spencer's Rifl				1	2				5								3						1			12	24
Spies, Guides and Wagoners																										2	2
Total	1			1	2	1	2		30	1	2						22	2	1	1	2	3	9	5	1	102	188

Names of Officers killed and Wounded as pr Genl. Return.

General Staff

Killed Col. Abraham Owens Aid de Camp to the Commander in Chief.

Field and Staff

Wounded, Lieut. Col. Joseph Bartholemew Commanding Indiana Militia Infantry
" Lieut. Colo. Luke Decker of " " "
" Major Joseph H. Daviess since dead Commanding Squadron Dragoons
" Doctor Edward Scull of the Indiana Militia
" Adjutant James Hunter of Mounted Rifflemen

U. S. Infantry including the Late Captain Whitneys Riffle Company

Wounded, Capt. W. C. Baen acting Major since dead.
" Lieut. George P. Peters
" Lieut. George Gooding
" Ensign Henry Burchstead

Colonel Deckers Detachment of Indiana Militia

Wounded, Capt. Jacob Warrick since dead.

Major Redmans Detachment of Indiana Militia

Wounded, Capt. John Norris

Major Wells's Detachment of Mounted Rifflemen

Wounded Capt. Frederick Guiger

Capt. Spencer's Company including Lieut. Berrys Detachment of Mounted Rifflemen

Killed Captain Spier Spencer
" 1st Lieut. Richard McMahan
" Lieut. Thomas Berry

NATH. F. ADAMS
Adjt. of the Army.

To His Excellency The Commander in Chief

William H. Harrison to William Eustis.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Vincennes 11th. Dec. 1811

Sir

To show you to what a pitch the Spirit of the Western Country has risen I enclose you one out of many letters, on the same Subject and containing similar offers, which I am almost daily receiving from Kentucky & Tennessee.

General Jackson (the writer)* bears a high character as a Soldier & a Patriot.

I have the Honor to be with great Respect Sir

Your humbl servt

WILLM HENRY HARRISON

The Honbl. William Eustis, Esq.
Sec. of War.

*See Jackson's letter, page 263.

A Report of the Sick and Invalided at Fort Knox Under the Command of Captain Cook, December 17th, 1811.

Photostat from Original in the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Companies	Names	Total	Remarks	
Capt. Cook	Sanderson	1	Wounded	Invalid
Barton's	Perry		Interm. fever	Convalescent
	Wilson		Ditto	Ditto
	Poland		Hypochondriac	(illegible)
	Foster	4	Wounded	Invalid
Late Baen's	Leonard		Inter. fever	Convalescent
	Hall		Scalld foot	Invalid
	Ballow		Wounded	Ditto
	Foster	4	Ditto	Ditto
Welches	Spaulding	1	Interm. fever	Convalescent
Whitney's	Sergt. J. Philips.....		Infl. fever	
	Dalton (?)		Intr. fever	Convalescent
	Hair		Ditto	Ditto
	Johnson		Ditto	Ditto
	Russell	5	Paralytic stroke	
Posey's Detachment	Sergt. Fairbanks.....		Wounded	Invalid
	Corp. Hicks.....		Inter. fever	Convalescent
	" Bolan.....		Ditto	Ditto
	Clark		Ditto	Ditto
	Ryans		Ditto	Ditto
	Page		Ditto	Ditto
	Comens		Ditto	Ditto
	Sheldon		Stiff knee	Invalid
	Benson		General Debility	
	Gibbs	10	Dropsy	Convalescent
	Total	25		

Per KUYKENDALL act.
R Surgeons Mate

(Continued)

9270- 7 (8)

Date Due

TRENT UNIVERSITY
0 1164 0298404 5

E173 .M29 no. 6
Manuscripts from the Burton
historical collection.
334837

DATE | ISSUED TO

334837